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SUMMARY
This thesis documents the evolution of absolute mobility in individual earnings, household income
and household consumption in the UK over the last 25 years. Absolute mobility is defined as the
fraction of children earning as much or more than the parents, in real times at a similar point in the
life-cycle, and is calculated using the decomposition technique introduced by Chetty, Grusky, et al.
(2017). In Chapter 1, I show that absolute earnings mobility was increasing until the mid-2000s,
and then plummeted due to the fall in real weekly earnings after the Great Recession. In 2018,
absolute earnings mobility was only 36 percent, about 22 percentage points lower than in 2008.
This decline in absolute earnings mobility could have been avoided if real weekly earnings had
continued to grow at the pre-recession trend. In Chapter 2, I show that absolute income mobility
was higher in levels than absolute earnings mobility, and the measure did not experience the
steep decline over the last decade. This gap between absolute earnings and income mobility can
be partly explained by the inclusion of non-labour earnings and welfare transfers in household
incomes, which were higher in the children’s generation compared to the parents. In addition,
the rise in labour force participation of women combined with the tremendous growth in their
earnings meant that dual-income households played a major role in raising and stabilizing the
level of absolute income mobility.
The final chapter in this thesis investigates the effect of an early-life climate shock on
mother’s breastfeeding behaviour and children’s anthropometric measures. I use the 1998 flood in
Bangladesh as a natural experiment to implement the difference-in-difference framework. I find
that children affected by the flood were breastfed for longer than those unaffected. In addition,
contrary to previous studies, children did not report any difference in height-for-age z-scores,
but had lower weight-for-age z-scores. Increased breastfeeding by mothers, along with generous
assistance in the form of food and finances from the government, ensured that children did not
suffer from the severe negative effect common in such extreme weather events.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis discusses two different topics across three chapters. The first two chapters are about
absolute intergenerational mobility and the third chapter is on the effect of early-life climate
shocks on children.
The last few years have seen a lot of discussion on millennials and their quality of life. A
poll by Ipsos MORI in (2017) shows that only 36 per cent of millennials believe they will be
financially better off than their parents. Thus, there is a perception that individuals today are
worse off than their parents, a concept captured by absolute mobility. In the first two chapters
of this thesis, I document the evolution of absolute mobility in terms of earnings, income and
consumption among 30-year-olds over the last 25 years in the UK, using the new decomposition
technique developed by Chetty, Grusky, et al. (2017). Not only is absolute mobility a measure
with an intuitive appeal, it also has a clear normative interpretation. Increases in absolute mobility
imply that more people enjoy higher standard of living than before, and therefore, there is an
increase in social welfare.
Chapter 1 details the change in absolute earnings mobility at the individual level. I focus on
labour earnings only, as it reflects returns to individual skill and is not affected by external policies
on welfare, or by family composition. The key result shows that absolute mobility had been on
the rise until the mid-2000s, but has fallen substantially thereafter. In 2018, only 36 percent of
children match or exceed their parents’ earnings, representing a decline of 22 percentage points
over the last decade. These results are robust to a number of changes in the way the data is
used. When estimating absolute earnings mobility, I assumed that relative mobility had remained
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constant based on prior literature (Blanden and Machin, 2008; Blanden and Macmillan, 2016). I
relax this assumption and show that relative mobility had a very small role to play in determining
absolute mobility, at least in the context of the UK. A large improvement or a worsening of
relative mobility was not associated with a significant difference in the level of absolute mobility.
Then, what contributed to the crash in absolute earnings mobility over the last decade? Using
counterfactual analysis I also also show that if real weekly earnings did not fall after the Great
Recession, absolute earnings mobility may not have declined.
Chapter 2 focuses on absolute mobility from the household perspective. I describe the change
in absolute mobility in terms of household income and consumption. Absolute income mobility
was also rising until the mid-2000s, but unlike absolute earnings mobility, only experienced a
gradual fall over the last decade. Between 2007-2017, absolute income mobility fell by only 8
percentage points, i.e. less than half the decline in absolute earnings mobility. In addition, absolute
mobility in income was also higher in levels than in earnings. Absolute consumption mobility,
on the other hand, has been roughly stable over the last decade, is lower than absolute income
mobility but higher than absolute earnings mobility. I show that the differences in levels and
trends between absolute mobility across the three dimensions point towards different insurance
mechanisms, in particular, the social transfer system and family labour supply. I also discuss two
reasons why absolute consumption mobility is lower in levels than absolute income mobility, and
smoother across time - possible precautionary savings behaviour and the increases in the share of
durable expenditures, due to higher housing costs, among children. Finally, I show that there is a
persistent gap between absolute mobility in individual incomes between women and men. This
gap cannot be explained by the choice of age in this study.
These chapters provide descriptive evidence of the changing trends in absolute intergenera-
tional mobility. However, a lot of areas remain unexplored. In this thesis, I take the view that
neither income nor consumption accurately reflects welfare, particularly in light of the different
measurement issues. However, future studies need to ask the question of what exactly we mean
by welfare in the context of absolute mobility. I also highlight the trend in absolute consumption
2
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mobility over the last decade only, due to data limitations. I hope to extend this series farther
back in future, so that I can provide concrete answers on why absolute consumption mobility
differs from the other measures. The rising housing costs among the children’s generation also
necessitate the study of consumption in terms of both non-durable and durable components, that
is also on the agenda for the future research. Despite these open questions, my research shows
that the social perception that millennials are worse off than their parents is legitimate. The next
step in part of the policy makers will be to take steps to improve this scenario.
Chapter 3 moves away from the discussions on intergenerational mobility and focuses on
another topic that is highly relevant in recent years. Extreme weather events are likely to increase
in frequency and magnitude due to climate change (Mirza, 2011), particularly in developing
countries (FAO, 2015) and with a disproportionately large effect on children (Rodriguez-Llanes
et al., 2011; Health, 2015). These shocks can have an irreversible adverse impact on children’s
health, especially if they are in utero or under the age of two (Barker, 1990; Almond and Currie,
2011; Rasmussen, 2001; Lucas, 2007). It is therefore essential to identify possible responses that
can mitigate the effect of these early-life climate shocks.
In this Chapter, I provide such an example by estimating the causal impact of the 1998 flood
in Bangladesh on a behavioural response, mother’s breastfeeding pattern, and on two outcome
measures, children’s height and weight. I exploit this event as a natural experiment to implement
the difference-in-difference framework. I find that flood-affected children are 59 percent less
likely to be weaned in any given month compared to unaffected children, and this effect is
more pronounced in areas that sustained larger crop losses. Not only is breastfeeding critical in
preventing early-life shocks from leading to childhood malnutrition (WHO, 2017), children aged
between 12-35 months who are breastfed for longer are at lower risk of deaths.
The combination of increased breastfeeding duration, generous government assistance in
food and finances through various programs, and bumper crops immediately following the flood
ensured that children did not suffer long-term damages. Unlike other such climate events in
various countries (Skoufias, Vinha, and Conroy, 2011; Rodriguez-Llanes et al., 2011; Caruso, 2015;
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Aguilar and Vicarelli, 2011), there is no effect of the flood on stunting among children, which
is generally irreversible and associated with poor cognitive and physical development (WHO,
2014). However, the flood increased the incidence of wasting among children affected by the
flood. Unlike stunting, wasting is mainly related to increased morbidity and indicates recent and
severe process of weight loss. However, it is important to address weight loss as soon as possible as
in the long-term, it may actually lead to stunting (WHO, 2014).
As in all empirical research, the quality of data limited my analysis. It would have been ideal to
study the effect of the flood on birth weight of children, but such information was unavailable. As
an alternative, I analysed if the flood increased the incidence of children being ‘smaller’ or ‘larger’
than average, but found no effect, in part due to the much smaller sample sizes. Additionally, there
was no data on complementary feeding practices which would have shed more light on the exact
reason behind the lower weights among flood-affected children. It would also have been quite
interesting to identify the long-run implications of the flood, if any. An important question that
goes unanswered is whether the lower weight-for-age z-scores eventually contributed to stunting
among flood-affected children, i.e. the long-term impact of the flood. However, recent waves of
the survey I use did not contain GPS locations making it impossible to properly identify household
residences and implement the difference-in-difference strategy. Nevertheless, this chapter provides
one example of a case where the effect of an early-life climate shock was mitigated.
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CHAPTER 1
FALLING ABSOLUTE EARNINGS MOBILITY IN THE UK
1.1. INTRODUCTION
Doing better financially than your parents is an important marker of success, and for much
of the last half century real earnings growth was strong enough so that most young people
achieved this milestone. One of the most notable changes in the UK over the last decade has
been the unprecedented fall in real earnings, triggered by the Great Recession. Real earnings
of the typical worker in the UK fell by almost 5 percent since 2008, much worse than in most
OECD countries and quite different to the previous recession experiences in the UK when real
earnings had continued growing (Blanchflower, Costa, and Machin, 2017). Moreover, younger
generations have been particularly badly hit, raising concerns about the consequences of growing
intergenerational inequalities. The question that arises from this experience is whether or not
individuals today are worse off than their parents. Have the standards of living worsened in recent
years?
Economists have typically considered the relationship between incomes across generations
by discussing relative mobility, i.e. the strength of association between the adult earnings of
children and their parents at a similar point in their adult life-cycle. This was seen as an important
measure of the openness, or “fairness” of society (see Blanden, Gregg, and Macmillan (2011), for a
more nuanced discussion of the interpretation of mobility). In the UK, it was found that relative
mobility had worsened between the 1958 and 1970 birth cohorts (Blanden, Goodman, et al.,
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2002), but has likely stabilised at the lower level for cohorts born after this (Blanden and Machin,
2008; Blanden and Macmillan, 2016). However, these changes in relative mobility do not account
for changes in the level of earnings. This was not much of a concern in the past when the UK
economy grew consistently, at least in terms of real wages, but is an important consideration in
recent years. In this chapter, I discuss how the overall economy affects the economic well-being
of children compared to their parents using the concept of absolute mobility.
Upward absolute earnings mobility1 is measured by the fraction of children who earn the
same as or more than their parents at about the same age, and is a consequence of changes in
real wages, relative mobility and earnings inequality. Increases in real wages over time increase
the probability that recent cohorts have higher earnings than parents, thus increasing absolute
mobility. On the other hand, changes to earnings inequality and relative mobility have an
ambiguous effect on absolute mobility. Increases in inequality among recent cohorts may imply
that absolute mobility increases in the upper tail of the earnings distribution and decreases in the
lower tail, with the overall effect being determined by the joint density of the two distributions
(i.e. relative intergenerational mobility). Relative mobility measures the fluidity of economic
fortunes, while absolute mobility measures absolute changes in economic resources. A society
with high absolute mobility is one where, regardless of the starting position of an individual (e.g.,
in terms of family income), recent cohorts earn at least as much or more than their parents.
Despite its importance, studies on absolute mobility in the UK are currently non-existent,
to the best of my knowledge, for at least two reasons. First, real wages have been growing in
the UK until recently, which meant that it was more important to focus on relative mobility
and understand how children moved within the distribution. Absolute mobility was much more
frequently discussed in sociological literature in terms of the proportion of people progressing
into middle class jobs (see Buscha and Sturgis (2018) for a review on sociological literature).
Second, there are no sufficiently large panel data with comparable earnings information for both
parents and their children for the UK. However, following the seminal paper by Chetty, Grusky,
1 Henceforth, I will refer to upward absolute earnings mobility as absolute mobility.
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et al. (2017), it is now possible to estimate absolute mobility, under some empirically plausible
assumptions, by combining two inputs: (I) marginal earnings distributions for parents and children
(available for long time histories), and (II) transition matrices for parent-child earnings (available
for the 1970 birth cohort only). I focus on 30-year-olds, but also examine 40-year-olds as a
robustness check.
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in three ways. I provide the first evidence
of the trend in absolute earnings mobility at age 30 between 1993-2018 in the UK. My results
show that absolute mobility had been on the rise until the mid-2000s, but has fallen substantially
thereafter. In 2005, almost two thirds of the 30-year-old children out-earned their parents, when
they were 30. However, in the decade since, absolute mobility declined by 22 percentage points –
in 2018, only 36 percent of children match or exceed their parents’ earnings. The strong decline
I observe in absolute mobility is robust to a number of changes in the way the data is used.
Cross-country rankings of relative mobility showed that the US and UK demonstrate similar and
lower socio-economic mobility compared to other developed countries (Blanden, 2013; Corak,
2013). Absolute earnings mobility in the UK and absolute income mobility in the US followed
a very similar pattern in recent years – despite the different measures in income and earnings.
However, the fall in the US started much earlier and was driven in part by rising inequality from
the 1970s. In contrast, absolute income mobility in Canada estimated using panel data was quite
stable and much higher than that of the UK even after the Great Recession (Ostrovsky, 2017).
Second, I show that relative mobility plays a small role in driving absolute mobility; at least
in the context of the UK over the last two decades. As there is no relevant data to estimate relative
mobility in the UK in recent years, I assume that relative mobility remained unchanged over the
last 24 years. To assess how sensitive the baseline estimates are to this assumption, I re-estimate
it with three different levels of relative mobility. Specifically, I use the same marginal earnings
distributions of fathers and children, but use three alternative transition matrices. Regardless of
the transition matrix used, absolute mobility evolves in roughly the same way, implying that the
baseline results are not driven by the assumption of fixed relative mobility. The main point to take
7
CHAPTER 1. FALLING ABSOLUTE EARNINGS MOBILITY IN THE UK
away from this empirical exercise is that regardless of the relative mobility experienced, fewer
30-year-olds today can match or exceed their statistical fathers’ earnings compared to a decade
ago.
Third, I highlight the debilitating role of falling real wages on absolute earnings mobility. If
real weekly earnings had continued to grow at two percent each year since the Great Recession
(following the pre-2008 trend), the proportion of 30-year-olds exceeding their fathers’ earnings
would be around 58 percent in 2018. The counterfactual exercises show that for the UK, growth
(or lack thereof ) in earnings is the major contributor to the fall in absolute earnings mobility in
recent years. This is different to the experience of the US, where both a reduced growth rate of
earnings and changes in the level of inequality explained the downward trend of absolute income
mobility (Chetty, Grusky, et al., 2017).
The remainder of the chapter proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology used to
measure absolute mobility, Section 3 provides details of the data used and the main trends within
it. Section 4 provides the baseline results and some heterogeneity analysis. Section 5 discusses
possible explanations behind the recent trends and Section 6 concludes.
1.2. PRIOR RESEARCH
Empirical studies on absolute mobility within economics is rather new. As Chetty, Grusky, et al.
(2017) states, "Despite longstanding interest in the topic, empirical evidence concerning absolute
income mobility remains scarce, mainly because of the lack of large, high-quality panel data sets
linking children to their parents...". They develop a new method of estimating absolute mobility,
one which combines information on marginal income distributions, available in most household
surveys, with empirically plausible assumptions on the level and stability of relative mobility.
Using this new method, they report that absolute income mobility in the US declined from 90
percent for children born in the 1940s to only 40 percent for children born in 1984. Both the
method and the stark decline in absolute mobility in the US has spurred new research into the
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area. Ostrovsky (2017) finds that absolute income mobility in Canada remained roughly constant,
while Berman (2018) perform a cross-country analysis of absolute income mobility and report a
declining pattern in several countries, including the UK.
The focus of these studies has been on absolute income mobility at the household level, while
I am interested in documenting the evolution of absolute earnings mobility at the individual
level. I discuss the literature relating to absolute mobility from a household perspective in Chapter
2. Additionally, I also discuss the research on absolute mobility of social class from sociological
literature, as it is more comparable with household income rather than individual earnings. In
this chapter, I investigate absolute earnings mobility in light of the decline in earnings. As there
is currently no evidence on absolute mobility in the UK (earnings or otherwise), I discuss the
studies looking into the factors affecting absolute mobility, i.e. relative earnings mobility, earnings
growth and inequality, starting with relative mobility.
Before any further discussion on the topic, it is important to make the distinction between
absolute and relative mobility. Absolute mobility compares the economic well-being of the child
to her parent’s economic well-being, at a similar point in the life-cycle2. Relative mobility, on the
other hand, is the strength of the association between the earnings rank of parents and the earnings
rank of children, with earnings reported at a similar point in the life-cycle of both groups. A
stronger association implies low relative mobility, as children’s position in the earnings distribution
is largely determined by their parental background, and vice versa. If every child made twice as
much as their parents, then all children would experience upward absolute mobility, but there
would be no change in relative mobility as their rank association with their parents’ earnings
remained unchanged. Relative mobility measures if individuals can achieve a higher quality of life
conditional on their family background, while absolute mobility highlights if they enjoy a higher
quality of life, regardless of their family background.
Atkinson, Maynard, and Trinder (1983) and Atkinson (1981) provides some of the early
2 In this Chapter, I evaluate this by comparing the real earnings of the child at age 30 to the real earnings of the
fathers at age 30. In Chapter 2, I assess absolute mobility using two alternative definitions as well.
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estimates of relative earnings mobility, by regressing the log earnings of children from 1975-1978
on log earnings of parents from 1950 on a small sample of about 300 parent-child pairs. He
concludes that there was ‘a significant degree of intergenerational continuities in earnings’, and
this persisted after life-cycle adjustments. Dearden, Machin, and Reed (1997) study the slope
coefficient between earnings of children at age 33 and earnings of parents when the children
are aged 16, for sons born in 1958. They also report somewhat strong persistence, of between
0.40-0.60 for men and 0.45-0.70 for women. Blanden, Goodman, et al. (2002) compare the slope
coefficient estimates from the National Child Development Survey to the British Cohort Study
and find that the intergenerational persistence had strengthened over time, and these changes were
robust to pre-labour market entry controls and also, a set of child-specific and family controls. In
other words, relative mobility had declined between the 1958 and 1970 birth cohorts. Nicoletti
and Ermisch (2008) use the British Household Panel Survey to study average log earnings over
1991-2003 for sons born between 1952 and 1970 and report no strong changes in intergenerational
mobility across these cohorts.
More recent studies on relative mobility focused on the relationship between educational
attainment and family income (Blanden and Machin, 2008; Blanden and Macmillan, 2016). As
educational attainment is strongly positively correlated to earnings, educational inequality by
family background can be considered a good proxy for relative earnings mobility. These studies
conclude that the decline in earnings mobility that took place between the 1958 and 1970 birth
cohorts is unlikely to have continued for subsequent 1970-2000 birth cohorts3.
The second and third factors affecting absolute mobility are the growth in earnings and
changes in the level of inequality, which are often studied together. Gregg, Machin, and Fernández-
Salgado (2014) document the growth in real weekly earnings between 1988 and 2013. They
report consistent growth in real weekly earnings between 1988-2003, followed by a slowing down
of the growth until 2008 and then finally, a crash after the Great Recession. Real weekly earnings
3 In my analysis, I use these results as justification for relying on a single transition matrix. However, I also check
the sensitivity of my analysis in subsequent sections.
10
CHAPTER 1. FALLING ABSOLUTE EARNINGS MOBILITY IN THE UK
fell by around 8 percent in the four years following the Great Recession, before stabilising in 2013
(Gregg, Machin, and Fernández-Salgado, 2014). Costa and Machin (2017) document a similar
trend in the growth of real weekly earnings, but provide additional evidence on the heterogeneity
of this experience. Median real weekly earnings grew at around two percent per annum until the
mid-2000s, and fell by about 3-5 percent depending on the price deflator used after the Great
Recession. Since 2014, there has been some signs of recovery although the growth rate has not
returned to pre-recession levels. Moreover, there were large differences in experiences by age,
with young workers (aged 18-21) enduring the brunt of the fall. Furthermore, the fall in real
weekly earnings was mainly concentrated at the top of the earnings distribution, with the 90th
percentile dropping by 6 percent and the bottom 10th percentile increasing by about two percent.
Belfield et al. (2017) also make an account of the variation across women and men. The gap in
real weekly earnings between women and men narrowed between 1994-2015, mainly due to the
significantly higher growth in women’s earnings relative to men’s.
Blundell and Etheridge (2010) report moderate growth in inequality in the late 1990s, due
to increased dispersion in earnings between the 50th and the 90th percentiles with little change
between the 10th and the 50th percentiles of the earnings distribution. After the Great Recession,
the fall in earnings was once again concentrated on the upper half of the distribution as well (Costa
and Machin, 2017). The total variation in inequality, in spite of these ups and downs, has been
concentrated within a narrow band - the Gini coefficient on earnings inequality remained within
0.30-0.35 (Blundell and Etheridge, 2010). Belfield et al. (2017) also highlight the differences
in inequality among women and men. Earnings inequality among women declined between
1994-2015, due to the large rises in female earnings at the bottom of the distribution, while that
among men actually increased.
This chapter is motivated by the experience of the unprecedented fall in real weekly earnings
in recent years. The measure of relative mobility is no longer sufficient to understand how the
standard of living compares across generations. I therefore document the evolution of absolute
earnings mobility across 25 years in the UK. In addition, I show that changes to relative mobility
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have minimal bearing on the recent changes in absolute earnings mobility, as the fall in earnings
overshadows all other factors.
1.3. METHOD
Upward absolute mobility for cohort c, Ac, is defined as the fraction of children in cohort c
whose earnings ykic match or exceed their parent’s earnings, y
p
ic, in real terms at a given age. The
superscripts k and p refer to the child and her parents respectively. This can be calculated as follows:
Ac =
1
Nc ∑i
1{ykic ≥ y
p
ic} (1.1)
Here, Nc is the total number of children in cohort c. If we had sufficiently long panel data with
relevant earnings information for both parents and children, we could directly calculate absolute
mobility using equation 1.1. However, such data does not exist for the UK, and therefore, we
follow the methodology introduced by Chetty, Grusky, et al. (2017).
Using the principle that an absolute quantity is the product of its relative quantity and another
quantity, Chetty, Grusky, et al. (2017) decompose absolute mobility into three parts: (I) the
marginal earnings distribution of children, (II) the marginal earnings distribution of parents, and
(III) the extent of relative mobility as operationalised by the transition matrix. This is shown
below:
Ac =
∫
1{Qkc(rk) ≥ Qpc (rp)}Tc(rk, rp) drkdrp (1.2)
Here, Qkc(rk) is the average earnings in the rth quantile of the children’s earnings distribution for
those born in cohort c, and similarly, Qpc (rp) is the average earnings in the rth quantile of the
parent’s earnings distribution for those who had a child in cohort c. The indicator function takes
the value one if a child’s average earnings in a given quantile Qkc(rk) is greater than the parent’s
earning, Qpc (rp). Estimating the marginal earnings distributions and consequently, this indicator
function, requires only cross-sectional information which is widely available for the UK.
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Tc(rk, rp) is the transition matrix estimate of relative mobility. Each element in the transition
matrix shows the probability of observing a pairwise rank combination (rk, rp) between children
and parents for cohort c. In other words, the transition matrix shows the probability of observing
a child whose earnings fall in rank rk and whose parents earned in rank rp, when they were the
same age. This requires panel data, and combined with the restrictions on having data on earnings
when parents and children are of similar age, this information is infrequently available. In my
baseline estimations, I assume that relative mobility is fixed at the level observed for the 1970 birth
cohort, i.e. Tc(rk, rp) = T1970(rk, rp). I discuss this assumption and its implications in Section 1.6.1.
Upward absolute mobility is the integral over the transition matrix for the fraction of cases
where the indicator function takes the value one. Thus, with repeated cross-sectional data and
some assumptions about relative mobility, we can estimate upward absolute mobility. Throughout
the thesis, I will refer to ’upward absolute mobility’ as absolute mobility for brevity.
1.3.1. Marginal Earnings Distribution
The marginal earnings distributions for children and for parents are constructed in the same
way. For each birth cohort c, I create quantile ranks using the group’s own earnings distribution.
Then, I take the average earnings within each quantile for each cohort. The marginal earnings
distribution is summarised by Qgc (rg), where g = k, p. Once again, cross-sectional information
is sufficient to estimate the marginal earnings distributions of either group. For example, with
survey data from 1994, I can estimate the marginal earnings distribution of g in 1994.
The choice of quantiles depends on data availability. With large enough samples, we can
construct percentile distributions that capture most of the information. However, the surveys
and cohort studies used to construct these distributions are not large enough to allow for the
construction of percentiles. I therefore consider decile distributions. I discuss this, and my
definitions for "children" and "parents" in Section 1.4.
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1.3.2. Transition Matrix
Transition matrices highlight the movement from one state to another; in this case, children’s
movement from their family’s position in the earnings distribution to their own position in their
earnings distribution for a given birth cohort. In this chapter, I only consider a single birth cohort
(that of 1970) due to data limitations4. For the birth cohort of 1970, I create decile ranks for
children using children’s earnings, and decile ranks for their parents using parental earnings. Then,
I calculate the probability of observing each pairwise rank combination non-parametrically. This
creates a 10 × 10 bi-stochastic transition matrix. For example, if T1970(1, 1) = 0.25 it implies that
the probability of observing that children remain in the same first decile earnings rank as their
parents is 25 percent.
1.4. DATA
I use data from three different surveys for each of the three components required to estimate
absolute mobility: The Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) provides information on the
earnings of children, the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) reports earnings from "parents", and
the British Cohort Study (BCS) describes the link between parent-child earnings.
The QLFS is a large and continuous household survey that started in 1973. The QLFS
contains detailed information on the labour market characteristics, but only began reporting
earnings data from 1993. The survey is used to inform social, economic and employment policies.
I use all available years of the QLFS with earnings information, 1993 to 2018, to construct the
marginal earnings distribution of the children. I will define children in the next subsection.
The FES is also an annual representative household survey designed to determine the basket
of goods and services for the consumer price index. The survey is digitally available from 1968 and
provides detailed individual level information on all members of the household, including their
4 I discuss the implications of this assumption, and possible alternatives in Section 1.6.1
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year of birth, their relation to other members and their labour earnings. I use the FES to construct
the marginal earnings distribution of "parents" (defined later). This is because the FES contains
historical records and therefore is informative of the older years; however, the sample sizes in FES
are much smaller than the QLFS, and therefore I do not use it for the children’s distribution as
well. The FES was changed to create another related survey after 2000 – I only use the 1968-2000
surveys.
The final survey I use is a cohort study, which reports parent-child linked information and
therefore, can be used for the construction of the transition matrix. The BCS sampled all children
born in a particular week in 1970 and reported various demographic and earnings information at
different ages of the child. Parental incomes were collected at age 16 of the child (average age
of father’s was 39 years), and the adult gross earnings of the child are available from the 2000
sweep when the children are 30 years old. In total, I have earnings information for about 3,400
parent-child pairs. This small sample size is the main reason why I work with deciles instead of a
more disaggregated rank distribution. In addition, an issue with the BCS is that it provides banded
net income for parents, while I am interested in earnings. I use the FES to impute gross median
earnings of parents, for those who had a child in 1970, for each band reported in the BCS. I use
the imputed earnings information along with the reported earnings data for children to construct
the transition matrix.
1.4.1. Sample Definitions
The unit of my analysis are individuals. The structure and size of families have changed over
the decades, but comparisons at the individual level remain consistent. I present household level
analysis in Chapter 2.
CHILDREN: Children are defined as individuals, both men and women, who are on average
30 years of age5 and who report earnings in the QLFS. I consider this age group as the majority
5 Specifically, all individuals between the ages 28 and 32 are included to aid the sample size.
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of individuals have completed their education and worked for a number of years by their thirties.
In other words, their earnings are quite stable. Those who report earnings at age 30 in 1993 were
born in 1963, and those reporting earnings at age 30 in 2018 were born in 1988. These birth
cohorts, 1963-1988, are used to match the children with their ’statistical’ parents. I construct a
separate marginal earnings distribution for each birth cohort of the child, 25 distributions in total.
FATHERS: Fathers are defined as men who had a child between 1963-1987, and who report
earnings information at age 30 in the FES. Fathers in my analysis refer to statistical fathers only.
I match children with their statistical fathers using the birth cohort information. For example,
children born in 1963 are matched with men who had a child in 1963. Note that fathers do
not have to be aged 30 when they have a child, only when they report earnings. For instance,
men aged 30 in 1967 and in 1968 may have had a child in 1965. Both these groups of men
will be matched with the birth cohort of 19686. This means that the father’s marginal earnings
distribution for any given birth cohort includes earnings from a number of different years. As
above, I construct 25 separate marginal earnings distributions for fathers.
In this chapter, I consider fathers only, instead of comparing children against their statistical
parents. In 1975 and 1985, women’s labour force participation at age 30 fell from about 60 percent
to only 40 percent (Blundell and Etheridge, 2010). Women possibly dropped out of the labour
force for child-birth and some may have stayed out while bringing up their children. Women who
remained in the labour force could have negotiated different contracts which allowed them greater
flexibility. In addition, some women who remained in the labour force may also be positively
selected based on skill level. Such changes in the labour force participation at age 30 are not evident
in the subsequent decades, such as in 1995. Therefore, to avoid selecting on non-representative
women, I exclude them from the parent sample. In future, I hope to include both parents for this
analysis.
6 This way of generating statistical fathers excludes men who did not have a child by the age of 30. The share of
men without children by the age of 30 increased from just 20 percent in the early 1970s to about 40 percent in
the late 1980s. This level was slightly more consistent among 40-year-olds, hovering between 10-20 percent.
Therefore, in my robustness check, I show the results for fathers at age 40.
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1.4.2. Variable Definitions
There has been an unprecedented fall in earnings since the Great Recession, and even a decade
later, earnings growth has not returned to the pre-recession trend. I therefore focus on absolute
earnings mobility. In addition, earnings reflect returns to individual skill and are not affected by
external policies, such as the level of transfers and taxes, the composition of the household etc.
I define earnings as the real weekly labour earnings only. All earnings are measured in pound
sterling and reported in 2016 prices.
1.4.3. Key Statistics
Here, I present the average growth in earnings, changes to earnings inequality and relative
mobility for the 1970 birth cohort.
GROWTH IN EARNINGS: Figure 1.1 compares the growth in the real weekly mean earnings
among fathers (in yellow) and children (in blue), indexed to the 1963 birth cohort. Real weekly
mean earnings among fathers grew continuously for all cohorts studied. In fact, fathers who had a
child in 1988 earned almost 60 percent more than fathers who had a child in 1963. This was also
true among children born up until the late-1970s, but does not hold thereafter. After the 1978
birth cohorts, real median weekly earnings for children fell. The 1988 birth cohort, for instance,
earned only about 16 percent more than the 1963 birth cohort – about 45 percentage points less
than the growth experienced by the corresponding fathers’ generation. These birth cohorts will
find it much harder to measure up to the earnings of the fathers due to this discrepancy in growth
rates.
CHANGES IN EARNINGS INEQUALITY: I report the Gini coefficients for children and fathers
as my measure of inequality in Table 1.1. Among the fathers, inequality steadily increased over
the years. Among the children, the level of inequality is considerably higher, but less volatile,
compared to the fathers.
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Figure 1.1.: The evolution of real weekly mean earnings
Source: FES (1968 - 2000), QLFS (1993-2018).
Growth rates are presented for real weekly mean individual earnings. Sample
includes 30-year-old individuals. Prices adjusted using the CPI.
Table 1.1.: Gini coefficient in earnings
Birth Cohort Earning
Parents Children
1965 0.18 0.33
1970 0.19 0.35
1975 0.20 0.32
1980 0.21 0.33
1985 0.25 0.33
1988 0.25 0.32
Source: FES (1968-2017), QLFS (1993-2017)
RELATIVE MOBILITY: I report the 10×10 transition matrix in Table 1.2. The probability of
observing a child who earns at the bottom decile conditional on having parents who also earned
at the same decile is 16 percent. Stronger persistence can be observed at the top left and bottom
right corners, and much weaker persistence at the other two corners. This pattern is common
18
CHAPTER 1. FALLING ABSOLUTE EARNINGS MOBILITY IN THE UK
across transition matrices, and very similar to the quintile transition matrix constructed by Jäntti,
Bratsberg, et al., 2006.
Table 1.2.: Transition Matrix, 1970
Children’s Parents’ Earnings Rank
Earnings Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.160 0.138 0.105 0.102 0.087 0.107 0.100 0.056 0.074 0.072
2 0.146 0.123 0.149 0.115 0.115 0.082 0.092 0.062 0.069 0.046
3 0.113 0.146 0.133 0.115 0.121 0.087 0.103 0.069 0.074 0.039
4 0.141 0.136 0.115 0.123 0.123 0.087 0.087 0.069 0.069 0.051
5 0.105 0.108 0.121 0.092 0.087 0.126 0.108 0.090 0.077 0.087
6 0.077 0.072 0.095 0.108 0.123 0.113 0.097 0.141 0.100 0.074
7 0.056 0.084 0.105 0.010 0.087 0.120 0.082 0.138 0.123 0.105
8 0.080 0.077 0.069 0.090 0.113 0.090 0.126 0.108 0.126 0.123
9 0.069 0.054 0.054 0.092 0.092 0.095 0.121 0.115 0.146 0.162
10 0.056 0.062 0.054 0.064 0.051 0.092 0.087 0.151 0.141 0.241
Source: BCS (1970)
1.5. RESULTS
I start this section by presenting my baseline result, and then move on to some heterogeneity
analysis for a comprehensive understanding of absolute earnings mobility. Finally, I discuss the
robustness of these estimates.
1.5.1. Baseline Result
In Figure 1.2, I present the evolution of absolute earnings mobility in the UK between 1993-2018.
These results are estimated using decile ranks for the marginal earnings distributions of children
and of fathers at age 30, and a 10×10 transition matrix estimated for the 1970 birth cohort. For
my baseline results, I assume that relative mobility was stable in this 25 year period, and therefore
the same transition matrix applies to all years. I relax this assumption in Section 1.6.1. All earnings
are adjusted for inflation using the CPI. Each year represents the year in which children reported
their earnings.
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Figure 1.2.: Absolute mobility in earnings
Source: FES (1968 - 2017), QLFS (1993-2018)
All measures are deflated using the CPI. Children and fathers report earnings at
age 30.
Absolute earnings mobility is roughly stable for the first 8 years of the study period. In 2000,
55 percent of children earned as much or more than the statistical fathers. This is the year in
which I observe relative mobility. In the next 5 years, absolute mobility kept growing, i.e. the
share of children earning more than the fathers increased. This is understandable given Figure
1.1 which shows that the growth in children’s earnings exceeded the fathers’. In 2005, absolute
earnings mobility was at its peak at about 62 percent. Afterwards, the growth rate in children’s
earnings began to decline and so did absolute earnings mobility. In 2008, the year of the Great
Recession, absolute earnings mobility was about 58 percent. Following this, absolute earnings
mobility plummeted. In 2018, only 36 percent of children earned as much or more than the
fathers – a decline of 22 percentage points over 9 years.
CHANGES ACROSS THE DISTRIBUTION: The above figure captures the average level of
absolute earnings mobility in each year. However, as I have decile ranks of the marginal earnings
distributions and the transition matrix, we can also investigate the trend in each decile of the
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fathers’ earnings. Figure 1.3 presents estimates of absolute mobility across each decile of father’s
earnings, and compares it to the baseline level shown in red. As expected, the level of absolute
earnings mobility is higher for children who come from poorer family backgrounds, and lower
for those who are from well-off backgrounds. However, the interesting part is in the trends
across time. Prior to 2005, children from all backgrounds experienced increasing levels of absolute
earnings mobility. With the crash in earnings, absolute earnings mobility declined across the
distribution, but particularly among those from well-off backgrounds. For example, absolute
mobility fell by 10 percentage points for children whose statistical fathers earned in the second
decile, and by 37 percentage points for those whose fathers earned at the ninth decile.
Figure 1.3.: Absolute mobility in earnings in each decile
Source: FES (1968 - 2017), QLFS (1993-2018)
All measures are deflated using the CPI. Children and fathers report earnings at
age 30.
The transition matrix showed that the probability of children from well-off backgrounds
themselves earning at the top of the distribution was quite high (about 24 percent if we consider
the top deciles only for parent-child pairs). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a large
number of children whose fathers’ earned at the 9th decile were top earners themselves. After the
Great Recession, earnings fell by a larger magnitude among the 90th percentile earners compared
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to the 10th decile earners, who were protected to some degree by the minimum wage legislations
(Costa and Machin, 2017). This suggests that the fall in absolute earnings mobility was possibly
driven by the fall in earnings. However, despite the recovery in earnings since 2014 (as shown in
Figure 1.1), there is no associated upward movement in absolute earnings mobility.
1.5.2. Dierences Across Women and Men
The baseline results show that the change in the growth rate of earnings possibly played a role in
the determination of absolute earnings mobility. The earnings growth rate also differed between
women and men. In Figure 1.4, I present the disaggregated results for men and women, along
with the baseline. I calculate transition matrices for parent-daughter pairs and parent-son pairs,
and assume them to be constant across all years. I also estimate the marginal earnings distributions
for women ("daughters") and men ("sons") using data from the QLFS, but I use the same baseline
marginal earnings distribution of fathers. This comparison can also be looked upon as a comparison
between daughters and fathers, and sons and fathers.
Absolute earnings mobility among women was lower than among men for all 25 years. Prior
to 2005, absolute earnings mobility among women was growing, while that among men was
roughly stable. Between 1993-2005, absolute earnings mobility among women increased by
about 14 percentage points. This led to a decline in the gap between absolute earnings mobility
among women and men. However, following the decline in earnings, absolute mobility began to
fall for both groups. Over the last decade, the percentage decline was roughly equal among men
and women (22 and 20 percentage points respectively). As a result, there was no further reduction
in the gap. In 2018, only 27 percent of women and 48 percent of men earn as much or more than
the fathers. In the Appendix A.1.1, I address the concern that earnings at age 30 may be lower for
women as it is a child-bearing age via an analysis on the difference in absolute earnings mobility
among women and men at age 40. I find that the gap in absolute earnings mobility still persists,
regardless of the selected age group.
These results are interesting for two reasons. First, it shows that the upward trend in absolute
22
CHAPTER 1. FALLING ABSOLUTE EARNINGS MOBILITY IN THE UK
Figure 1.4.: Absolute mobility across women and men
Source: FES (1968 - 2017), QLFS (1993-2018)
All measures are deflated using the CPI. Children and fathers report earnings at
age 30.
mobility prior to 2005 was driven mostly by the experience among women. And secondly, even
though women’s real weekly earnings have seen a higher annual growth rate compared to men’s
real weekly earnings between 1994-2015 (Belfield et al., 2017), absolute earnings mobility among
women continue to be worse than among men.
1.5.3. Dierences Across Age Groups
I chose to investigate 30-year-olds as they represent a point at which individuals have completed
education and also have at least a few years of experience. However, a question may be whether
or not 30-year-olds are representative of other age groups. In Figure 1.5, I present the estimates
for 40-year-olds, along with the baseline for comparison. Absolute mobility among 40-year-olds
is computed using the marginal earnings distributions of 40 year old children and parents, and
the same baseline transition matrix. The comparison with 40-year-olds also addresses the issue of
possible life-cycle bias (Haider and Solon, 2006) when considering 30-year-olds. If fathers are
at a later stage in their careers at age 30 than children are, due to increase in the age of school
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completion for example, then this could bias the absolute mobility estimates downwards. Earnings
at age 40 is more representative of the lifetime earnings and less likely to suffer from this bias. In
the Appendix A.1.2, I provide further evidence that my results are not driven by such a bias. In
addition, considering fathers at age 40 also accounts for those fathers who may be missing from
the baseline sample as they had a child after the age of 30. Between 80-90 percent of men had had
a child at age 40, compared to 60-80 percent at age 30.
Figure 1.5.: Absolute mobility at age 30 and age 40
Source: FES (1968 - 2017), QLFS (1993-2018)
All measures are deflated using the CPI. Children and fathers report earnings at
age 30 and at age 40.
The qualitative finding of hump-shaped absolute mobility pattern is the same among 30 and
40 year old individuals. Both 30 and 40-year-olds start experiencing the decline approximately
around 2005, but the extent of the fall is worse for 30-year-olds compared to 40-year-olds.
Compared to the 22 percentage point decline among 30-year-olds, 40-year-olds endured a 16
percentage point fall. In fact, the fall in earnings since the Great Recession was much worse among
the younger cohorts (Costa and Machin, 2017). Most importantly, however, the main result that
absolute earnings mobility has faced a large decline over the last decade is consistent regardless of
the age group analysed.
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1.6. UNDERSTANDING THE FALL IN ABSOLUTE EARNINGS MOBILITY
1.6.1. The Importance of Relative Mobility
My baseline results assumed that relative mobility stayed constant for two reasons. First, there is a
lack of longitudinal surveys that link parents and children, and report their earnings at roughly the
same age. Second, the evidence on relative mobility in the UK shows that it worsened between
the 1958 and 1970 birth cohorts (Blanden, Goodman, et al., 2002), and has been stable thereafter7
(Blanden and Machin, 2008; Blanden and Macmillan, 2016). In addition, Berman (2018) also show
that relative mobility plays only a small role in determining absolute mobility. Nonetheless it is
important to understand how sensitive the baseline results are to this restriction, and this section
provides the answers.
Here, I present three alternative transition matrices I use to re-estimate absolute mobility.
The first of the empirically observed transition matrix is constructed using a more recent cohort
study, the Next Steps (Wave 2 and Wave 8). Next Steps follows a cohort of children born in 1990.
Wave 2 (2005) reports the parent’s earnings, when the cohort members are 15 years of age and
wave 8 (2016), the latest, reports the cohort members’ own earnings. The reason I do not use
this cohort study in my baseline is because the cohort members, i.e. the children, are only 25
years old when reporting earnings. Earnings at this age is poorly correlated with lifetime earnings
(Haider and Solon, 2006), creating a small attenuation bias in rank-rank based measures (Nybom
and Stuhler, 2017). In addition, the birth cohort of 1990 is outside our sample window which
runs from 1963-1987. When using this data here, I do not claim that the matrix is unbiased, only
that it is an observed alternative.
The second transition matrix is constructed for the US by Chetty, Hendren, et al. (2014),
and applies to children born between 1980 and 1982. This transition matrix relates to a more
recent birth cohort than our baseline transition matrix. In the past, the level of relative mobility in
7 Due to the lack of data on earnings for more recent cohorts, these studies have focused on test scores, educational
attainment etc.
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the UK was higher than that of the US, although both fared worse than the Nordic countries
(Blanden, Gregg, and Machin, 2005; Jäntti, Bratsberg, et al., 2006). These studies compared
relative mobility using the 1958 birth cohort from the National Child Development Study in the
UK, and the 1957-1967 birth cohorts from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)
for the US. However, there is no empirical comparison of relative mobility for more recent birth
cohorts.
The third transition matrix is the equal opportunity matrix. This choice of name stems from
the fact that the children’s earnings rank is independent of the parents’ earnings rank, TEO(i, j) = 1r
where r is the number of quantiles. In other words, all pairwise rank combinations are equally
likely. Although not plausible, I use this transition matrix to describe absolute mobility in an
extreme case of perfect relative mobility.
Before estimating absolute earnings mobility, I compare the three transition matrices and my
baseline matrix using the Spearman’s rank correlation. Let pij be the probability of observing a
child in rank i whose parents are in rank j. Then the Spearman’s rank correlation is as follows for
a 10×10 matrix:
ρ =
1
3(10)(102 – 1)
–3(10)(10 + 1)2 + 12
10
∑
i
10
∑
j
ijpij

The results are presented in Table 1.3. I also rank each transition matrix in terms of this correlation.
Stronger correlation implies lower relative mobility, as parental background is more closely
associated with children’s earnings. The equal opportunity matrix, by construction, is ranked 1 as
it shows zero correlation. Following the equal opportunity matrix is the baseline transition matrix
estimated using the BCS (1970), and then the transition matrix for the USA. The least relative
mobility is shown by the Next Steps (1990) matrix, which makes sense due to the presence of
life-cycle bias. This table shows that the alternative transition matrices do not exhibit the same
level of relative mobility. Therefore, there is no reason to expect absolute mobility re-estimated
with these transition matrices to be the same as the baseline.
26
CHAPTER 1. FALLING ABSOLUTE EARNINGS MOBILITY IN THE UK
Table 1.3.: Spearman’s Rank Correlations
Transition Matrix
Spearman’s
Rank
Correlation
Relative
Mobility
Birth Cohort Name Rank
1970 BCS, Baseline 0.258 2
1980-82 USA 0.337 3
1990 Next Steps 0.373 4
Equal Opportunity 0 1
Source: BCS(1970) Chetty, Hendren, et al., 2014, Next Steps (2000)
RE-ESTIMATING ABSOLUTE MOBILITY: To re-estimate absolute mobility, I use the same
marginal earnings distributions for the children and the parents, but a different transition matrix.
The results for each of the three alternative matrices and the baseline are presented in Figure 1.6.
Absolute earnings mobility changes remarkably little with the use of these alternative transition
matrices. The equal opportunity represents a hypothetical extreme of maximum relative mobility,
and the Next Steps provide an example of much lower relative mobility. The difference between
the baseline measure and either one of these transition matrices are a maximum of two percentage
points only in any given year. This indicates that the baseline results are robust to the assumption
of fixed relative mobility; the transition matrices play only a small role given these marginal
earnings distributions. In the Appendix A.1.3, I also show that my results are robust to using the
bounds analysis developed by Chetty, Grusky, et al. (2017). Even with transition matrices that
maximise and minimise absolute mobility, we still see a steep decline over the last decade.
Looking back at Equation 1.2 can help explain why the steep decline in absolute mobility
persists regardless of the level of absolute mobility. In Figure 1.7, I present the inflection points, the
line above which the indicator function takes the value one. To estimate absolute mobility, we
simply sum the values in the transition matrix where the indicator function takes value one, i.e.
in the region above the line. Therefore, the higher the inflection line is, the lower is the area in
which to sum over, implying lower absolute mobility. I show the inflection lines for two years
only, 2005 (in blue) and 2018 (in red), as they represent the observed maximum and minimum
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Figure 1.6.: Absolute mobility with alternative transition matrices
Source: FES (1968 - 2017), QLFS (1993-2018), BCS (1970), Next Steps (2000),
Chetty, Hendren, et al. (2014)
All measures are deflated using the CPI. Children and fathers are aged 30.
levels of absolute mobility.
Consider the median decile earners among fathers. In 2005, to out-earn the median earning
of fathers, children had to earn at the fourth decile only (lower than the fathers’ rank). But in
2015, children have to earn in the 6th decile (higher than the fathers’ rank). This issue is only
exacerbated as we move to the top of the fathers’ distribution. For example, to overcome fathers’
earnings in the 9th decile, children had to be in the 6th decile in 2005 and the 9th decile in 2018.
In other words, children’s earnings had to be in a higher rank than the fathers in 2018, while it
was the opposite in 2005.
In the region above the red line, the indicator function for both 2005 and 2018 take the value
one. In the region below the blue line, both indicator functions take the value zero. However, in
the area between the red and blue line, only the indicator function for 2005 takes the value one.
This means that we are always summing over a larger area for 2005, compared to 2018. Given
that the transition matrices are bi-stochastic, it is therefore not possible to have a higher level of
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Figure 1.7.: Inflection coordinates of the Indicator Function
Source: FES (1968 - 2017), QLFS (1993-2018)
All monetary values are adjusted for inflation using the CPI.
absolute mobility in 2018 compared to 2005.
1.6.2. The Role of Earnings Growth
Absolute mobility declined steeply over the last decade. In the previous section, I showed that this
fall cannot be explained by relative mobility; changing the level of relative mobility does not alter
the evolution of absolute mobility. The two other factors that determine absolute mobility are the
growth rate of earnings and the change in the level of inequality. We know that earnings declined
among children, while that among parents continued to grow. We also know that the level of
inequality among the children’s generation is much higher than the parents, but the level has not
fluctuated much in recent years. In fact, the level of inequality among children is lower in 2018
(and therefore, closer to the level among parents), than before the Great Recession. Therefore,
earnings inequality is unlikely to be the main contributor behind the fall in absolute earnings
mobility. In this section, I investigate how the growth in earnings affected absolute earnings
mobility. In the Appendix A.2, I conduct the same analysis on inequality as well.
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Median real weekly earnings grew at around 2 percent per year from 1980 to the early 2000s
(Costa and Machin, 2017), at which point it slowed and after the Great Recession in 2008, it
actually fell. In this counterfactual exercise, I investigate what the level of absolute mobility would
have been if this decline in earnings after the Great Recession did not take place, keeping other
factors constant. To estimate this counterfactual absolute earnings mobility, I use the baseline
transition matrix and the baseline marginal earnings distribution of fathers. I create a counterfactual
distribution for children as follows. Between 1993-2007, children’s earnings follow the baseline.
After 2008, children’s earnings grew by two percent each year, but the shape of the distribution,
i.e. the share of earnings at each decile, remained the same. This is calculated as follows:
Qk,cft (r
k) =

Qkt (r
k), t <= 2007
Qkt (r
k)
∑rQkt (rk)
∑rQkt (r
k)× 1.02t–2007, t > 2007
Here, Qk,cft (r
k) is the counterfactual marginal earnings for a given decile and t is the year in which
children reported their earnings. The remaining notation is the same as in Equation 1.2. Prior to
2008, the counterfactual equals the baseline marginal earnings distribution. After 2008 onwards,
the share of earnings in each decile remains the same, as shown by the fraction in the equation
above. This ensures that the level of dispersion and hence, inequality, remains unchanged. I
multiply the share with the total earnings across all deciles times the growth level.
The results are shown in Figure 1.8. The counterfactual absolute mobility trend replicates the
baseline until 2007, after which it diverges. In 2008, when the counterfactual earnings grew by
two percent, counterfactual absolute earnings mobility was 60 percent compared to the baseline
rate of 58 percent. Over the decade as earnings continued to grow, absolute earnings mobility
remained high. In fact, in 2018, the counterfactual absolute earnings mobility is 58 percent,
compared to only 36 percent in the baseline. The figure shows that had there been no fall in real
earnings for children (and other factors remained as they are), 30-year-olds in recent years could
have experienced the same high level of absolute mobility as those in the past.
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Figure 1.8.: Absolute mobility under counterfactual earnings growth
Source: FES (1968 - 2017), QLFS (1993-2018)
All monetary values are adjusted for inflation using the CPI. Baseline specifications
used for fathers, children (1993-2007), and the transition matrix. From 2008
onwards, children are assumed to enjoy two percent annual growth in earnings,
creating the counterfactual.
1.7. CONCLUSION
I provide the first evidence of the dramatic fall in absolute mobility in the UK among recent
birth cohorts of 30 year old individuals. I find that the trend in absolute mobility from 1993
to 2018 exhibits a humped shape, where absolute mobility slowly improved until 2005 and fell
steeply thereafter. Only 36 percent of children earn as much or more than their parents in 2018, a
decline of 22 percentage points from 2005. The findings further establish that the crash in absolute
mobility was in large part among the high-earners, and that some part of the decline is mitigated
by experience in the job market.
The baseline results on absolute mobility relies on the assumption that relative mobility
remained constant throughout the period, allowing the use of a single transition matrix. This
assumption is motivated by existing literature that found relative mobility to have fallen between
1958 and 1970, but remained stable thereafter (Blanden andMachin, 2008; Blanden andMacmillan,
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2016). I relax this assumption by evaluating the change in absolute mobility under several different
transition matrices, both empirical and simulated. Even if relative mobility had improved to
represent a society with equal opportunities, absolute mobility would still be about 22 percentage
points lower in 2018 compared to 2008. There is no significant effect of worsening relative
mobility on absolute mobility either. This implies that the baseline results are not susceptible to
the choice of the transition matrix - absolute mobility is worse today compared to a decade prior.
Using a counterfactual exercise, I show that the main driver of the difference in the pattern of
absolute mobility is the fall in real weekly earnings. If real weekly earnings continued to grow at
pre-recession levels of two percent annually, absolute mobility could have been maintained at the
pre-recession level of about 58 percent. These results highlight the need to refocus policy dialogues
on understanding the causes behind the real earnings decline and take actions to stimulate growth
as soon as possible to prevent further dissatisfaction among the younger generations.
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ABSOLUTE MOBILITY IN HOUSEHOLDS
2.1. INTRODUCTION
Most people aspire to enjoy a better standard of living than their parents. The unprecedented fall
in real weekly median earnings in the UK over the last decade raised the question of whether
such hope could still be realised. Over the last decade, absolute earnings mobility - the fraction of
children earning as much or more than the parents - declined by about 18 percentage points
among 30-year-olds in the UK (presented in Chapter 1). Upward absolute mobility in social class
also depicts a worsening trend among both men and women (Buscha and Sturgis, 2018). However,
very little attention has been paid to absolute mobility at the household level, particularly in terms
of incomes and consumption. Understanding how absolute mobility in these dimensions evolve
can shed light on the insurance mechanisms available to households, such as the tax and transfer
system, credit markets, family formation and composition, informal gifts and so on.
The primary objective of this paper is to describe the evolution of absolute income and
consumption mobility in the UK between 1994 and 2017, focusing on 30-year-old children and
parents with robustness checks on other age-groups. I estimate absolute mobility by combining
two inputs, the marginal outcome distributions for children and for parents, and relative mobility,
following the methodology in Chetty, Grusky, et al. (2017). I use cross-sectional data from the
Family Expenditure Survey to construct the marginal income distribution of parents, and marginal
consumption distribution for both parents and children, and the Family Resources Survey for the
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marginal income distribution of children. I use a simulated transition matrix with conditional
independence between parent and child income ranks as my measure of relative mobility. This is
based on the finding in Chapter 1 that relative mobility played a very small role in determining
absolute mobility, also corroborated theoretically by Berman (2018). Key terms are defined as
follows: Household gross income is the sum of labour and non-labour earnings, including transfers
across the household head and partner (if any); net income simply deducts taxes and national
insurance contributions from household gross income. Consumption is the total household
expenditure on non-durables, following Blundell and Etheridge (2010). All households where
the head or partner is on average 30 years of age, and who reported their outcomes (earnings,
incomes and consumption) are included in my sample.
Absolute income mobility in the UK follows a similar pattern to that of absolute earnings
mobility - it increased until mid-2000s and then began to decline. However, apart from this
general trend, there are stark differences in other measures. Absolute income mobility is higher in
levels than absolute earnings mobility for all 24 years. For instance, absolute income mobility is 61
percent in 2018, which is almost 28 percentage points higher than absolute earnings mobility. In
addition, absolute incomemobility did not experience as sharp a drop over the last decade as absolute
earnings mobility. Between 2007 and 2017, absolute income mobility fell by only 8 percentage
points, i.e. less than half the decline in absolute earnings mobility. Absolute consumption mobility,
on the other hand, has been roughly stable over the last decade. In 2017, 47 percent of children
consumed as much or more than the parents.
The second objective of the paper is to document how absolute mobility varies across the
three dimensions. There are two differences in how I define income and earnings: income is
the sum of both labour and non-labour earnings, including welfare transfers; and income is
measured at the household level, whereas earnings are measured at the individual level. These
two differences can be thought of as insurance mechanisms that allow individuals to smooth out
consumption in response to changes in earnings. I make two comparisons to highlight the relative
contribution of each mechanism. First, I compare absolute mobility in individual earnings with
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individual income. Absolute mobility in individual incomes follow the same trend as absolute
earnings mobility, including the rate of decline over the last decade. However, absolute mobility
in individual incomes is higher than absolute mobility in earnings across all years. This gap can
be explained by the inclusion of non-labour earnings and welfare transfers. There were large
increases in social assistance in the period between 1997 and 2010, including more generous
out-of-work safety nets for families with children, although means-tested working-age transfers
underwent broad-based cuts as part of fiscal consolidation measures from 2011 (Blundell, Joyce,
et al., 2018). These increases affected only the children, i.e. their incomes were higher than their
earnings, and therefore so was the level of absolute income mobility.
Second, I compare absolute mobility in individual income with household incomes. Absolute
mobility in household incomes is not only higher in levels of absolute mobility in individual
incomes, the fall over the last decade is also comparatively lower. The gap in this case explains the
role of the family, in particular of dual-income households. Not only do more women participate
in the labour force at age 30 in recent decades (Blundell and Etheridge, 2010), but their earnings
have also seen considerably faster growth than men’s earnings, especially at the bottom end of the
income distribution (Blundell, Joyce, et al., 2018). Dual-income households have therefore played
a major role in raising and stabilising the level of absolute mobility in household income.
The relation between absolute mobility in income and consumption is more complex. Ab-
solute consumption mobility, unlike earnings and income, fell by only three percentage points
over the last decade1. On the other hand, the level of absolute consumption mobility is much
lower than that of income. There are two potential reasons behind this. First, it indicates that
households had access to consumption-smoothing mechanisms. It is possible that faced with the
negative shock to earnings, households do not to consume the entirety of their incomes, and
instead engage in precautionary savings behaviour. The caveat here is that we do not observe the
trends at the beginning of the sample period, which makes it difficult to conclude if this is indeed
1 In the Appendix, I show that the level of absolute consumption mobility in 2018 was not significantly different
from that of 2008, i.e. there was no significant decline.
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the case. The second possible reason relates to how I define consumption using the expenditure
on non-durables only. This is because durables generate a flow of service and are not necessarily
consumed immediately after purchase. In addition, housing housing, a type of durable, now
accounts for twice the share of income than it did in the 1970s (Cribb, Hood, and Joyce, 2016).
These differences in the share of consumption of durables to non-durables could explain part of the
gap. Is absolute consumption mobility a better measure of welfare changes across generations than
absolute income mobility? I take the view of Blundell (2014) that neither income nor consumption
accurately reflects welfare, particularly in light of the different measurement issues. However,
when studied together, these two dimensions can provide a more comprehensive understanding
of the dynamics of absolute mobility.
Finally, I examine the difference in absolute mobility between women and men. I compare
the individual incomes of women and men with the individual income of the fathers. I only
estimate absolute mobility at the individual level when disaggregating by gender, as it is not
possible to determine a household as belonging to the daughter or the son as I cannot track families.
In 2018, only 46 percent of women and 54 percent of men enjoyed upward absolute mobility.
This difference in levels persists throughout the period studied, although the gap had been on
a steady decline between 1994 and 2005. This was a period during which, women from all
income backgrounds and men from only higher income backgrounds enjoyed increasing absolute
mobility (those from lower income backgrounds experienced stable trends). These differences
prevail even if I consider women at age 30 with no children, or women at age 40, indicating that
they are not artefacts of 30 being a traditionally child-bearing age.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, I provide an overview of the
existing literature. Section 2.3 and 2.4 discusses the methodology and the data used to construct
the measures of absolute mobility. Section 2.5 presents the main results and Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2. PRIOR RESEARCH
Most of the existing research on intergenerational mobility has focused on relative mobility, i.e.
the strength of association between the adult earnings of children and their parents at a similar
point in their adult life cycle (see reviews in Jäntti and Jenkins, 2014; Corak, 2013). As a measure
of fairness and for an understanding of distributional equity in a society, relative mobility was
considered the more important measure. However, relative mobility cannot account for changes
in the growth of earnings between children and parents. For example, relative mobility would
remain unchanged even if the children’s incomes halved in a given year. And more importantly,
relative mobility plays a small role in determining absolute mobility in the context of the UK. I
discuss the literature on relative mobility in Chapter 1, where I focus on absolute earnings mobility
and the factors affecting this measure. In this review, I focus on measures that are reflective of the
changes in the standard of living, such as absolute mobility in social class, absolute mobility in
incomes, and a short discussion on consumption.
The recent decline in earnings and income, and the large rise in inequality in the 1980s,
make it essential to investigate absolute mobility. This measure also has two added advantages.
It has an intuitive appeal: Most adults are able to compare their standard of living with that of
their parents. However, they are unlikely to be aware of how their chances of achieving a given
income rank vary compared to others they knew as children. The second advantage is, it has a
clear normative interpretation. Increases in relative mobility, by virtue of being zero-sum, means
that as one person moves up the rank distribution, someone else must move down. In contrast,
increases in absolute mobility mean that more people now enjoy higher living standards, and
thereby, improved welfare.
Until recently, absolute mobility in the UK had been mainly studied in terms of social class.
The social class of an individual is determined by a combination of the individual’s occupation and
employment status. Since 2001, the official statistics use the National Statistics Socio-Economic
Classification (NS-SEC) to determine an individual’s social class. At the top of the hierarchy are
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the Salariats, individuals who occupy higher or lower managerial and professional occupations.
At the bottom of the hierarchy are the Working Class, individuals engaged in semi-routine or
routine occupations. Upward absolute mobility is achieved if an individual from the bottom of the
hierarchy moves to the top. For example, individuals who belong to the Salariat, but whose fathers
were in theWorking class, have experienced upward absolute mobility in social class. Individuals
whose social class does not change across generations are considered immobile. If the opposite
happens, i.e. individuals occupy a lower class than their parents, then downward absolute mobility
in social class takes place.
Despite the longstanding research in the topic, there is a lack of consensus on the trend of
absolute mobility (see Buscha and Sturgis (2018) for a review). I found two major studies that
closely resemble the sample discussed here in terms of age groups and the use of true birth cohorts.
Bukodi et al. (2015) report a declining trend in upward absolute mobility and increasing trend
in downward absolute mobility among men and women at ages 27 and 38 between the 1946
and 1980-84 birth cohorts respectively. Buscha and Sturgis (2018) find a similar pattern for men
at ages 30 to 36 between 1955-61 and 1975-81 birth cohorts. However, they note an increase
in upward absolute mobility for women (and decrease in downward mobility) at the same ages,
across the same birth cohorts.
Economists studying intergenerational mobility have focused on earnings or incomes, instead
of social class for one key reason: Social class tends to be stable across time even when the earnings
or incomes within these classes fluctuate (Blanden, Gregg, and Macmillan, 2011; Atkinson,
Maynard, and Trinder, 1983; Brown, 1977). In other words, social class captures a limited amount
of the possible variation in outcomes between individuals and their parents. As a result, measuring
absolute mobility using social classes may understate the actual extent of the change.
Empirical evidence on absolute income mobility is currently unavailable, due to the lack of
large, longitudinal survey with linked parent-child information. Addressing these challenges in
data, Chetty, Grusky, et al. (2017) present a new method for estimating absolute mobility. They
show that under some plausible assumptions on relative mobility, cross-sectional surveys over
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several years are sufficient to calculate absolute mobility. They report on the ’fading American
dream’: Absolute income mobility in the US declined from about 90 percent for 30-year-old
children born in the 1940s to only 50 percent for those born in the 1980s. This dramatic decline
in absolute mobility in the US, along with the feasible methodology, resurfaced the interest in
absolute income mobility. Ostrovsky (2017) find that absolute income mobility in Canada has
been remarkably stable, unlike the US. Absolute income mobility among 30-year-old children
was 48 percent in the 1970 birth cohort, 55 percent for the 1977 birth cohort and 53 percent for
the 1984 birth cohort. However, these estimates potentially suffer from the life-cycle bias. For
example, in the 1970 birth cohort, children’s incomes reported at age 30 were compared to parent
incomes, when parents were aged 19-22.
More recently, Berman (2018) simplified Chetty, Grusky, et al. (2017)’s methodology further
by introducing two changes. He uses the method of generalised Pareto curve interpolation
(Blanchet, Piketty, and Fournier, 2017) to derive the marginal income distributions using two
points - the mean and some measure of inequality. Second, he shows that the rank correlation
is a sufficient statistic to capture the details in relative mobility. Using these modifications, he
demonstrates replication of the absolute mobility trend found in Chetty, Grusky, et al. (2017)
and also report on estimates across several countries, including the UK. However as he did not
use a suitable micro-data source, these findings do not accurately represent the trend in absolute
income mobility in the UK. In Appendix B.1, I discuss why my results are more relevant and the
reasons for the divergence between the estimates provided here and in Berman (2018).
While there has been some study of absolute income mobility in different countries, there
is almost no mention of absolute consumption mobility. The problem is that consumption can
only be measured through expenditures, which is difficult to measure in and of itself (Meyer and
Sullivan, 2003; Attanasio and Pistaferri, 2016). For example, expenditures include purchase of
durables, which may not necessarily be consumed in the same period (Blundell and Etheridge,
2010). Consumption may also be generated through goods and services received in-kind or created
at home (Attanasio and Pistaferri, 2016), neither of which are reported in surveys. Moreover,
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expenditures are a product of quantities and prices, the latter of which differ between locations
and also between seemingly homogeneous products (Attanasio and Pistaferri, 2016). In spite
of these issues, a few studies on intergenerational mobility have researched consumption, but
only to estimate relative mobility in consumption and mainly in the context of the US2 (e.g.,
Bruze, 2018; Attanasio and Pistaferri, 2016; J. Fisher, D. Johnson, Latner, et al., 2016; Jappelli and
Pistaferri, 2006; D. S. Johnson and J. D. Fisher, 2018; J. Fisher, D. Johnson, Smeeding, et al., 2018).
These studies vary in their definitions of consumption (considering only non-durables, imputing
consumption from various sources, generating service flow from durables, etc.). However, even
within the US, there is no clear consensus on the level of relative consumption mobility.
This chapter presents empirical evidence on the evolution of absolute mobility in income
and consumption in the UK, across almost 24 years. In addition, this chapter also highlights the
mechanism through which absolute mobility in earnings and income are related. Finally, this
chapter provides additional evidence on the trend of absolute mobility in individual incomes
between women and men.
2.3. METHODOLOGY
Upward absolute mobility3 measures the degree to which children’s outcomes match or exceed
that of their parents, with the assumption that higher mobility reflects an improvement in material
well-being. Estimating absolute mobility has traditionally been very data-intensive - we needed
parent-child linked data with outcome information for each at a similar point of their cycle. This
data requirement has meant that empirical studies on absolute mobility were few and typically
focused on incomes or social class, outcomes for which data was available at least in some select
countries. With the innovation by Chetty et al. (2017), it is now possible to estimate absolute
mobility using repeated cross-sectional data, under plausible assumptions about relative mobility.
2 Bruze (2018) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2006) are exceptions in investigating consumption mobility in Denmark
and Italy respectively.
3 Henceforth, I refer to upward absolute mobility as simply absolute mobility.
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I discuss this methodology in greater detail in Chapter 1, and summarise the key points here. I
use this method to study absolute mobility in incomes and consumption, and compare it with my
findings on earnings from Chapter 1. I refer to earnings, incomes and consumption as outcomes
and compute absolute mobility of a given outcome as follows:
Ac =
∫
1{Qkc(r
k) ≥ Qpc (rp)} TEO,c(rk, rp)drkdrp (2.1)
Absolute mobility for a given cohort is the sum over the integral of the transition matrix,
TEO,c(rk, rp), for all the cases where the children’s outcome matches or exceeds that of the parents,
as shown by 1{Qkc(rk) ≥ Qpc (rp)}. Although I construct a measure of absolute mobility in terms of
birth cohorts of children, I report my result in the years in which children’s outcomes are observed
for ease of understanding. For example, the birth cohort of 1980 refers to the year 2010, when
earnings of children are reported. The two components needed to estimate absolute mobility are
the transition matrix TEO,c, and the marginal distributions.
1. TRANSITIONMATRIX: I construct a 10-by-10 equal opportunity matrix to use as my baseline
transition matrix, assuming that relative mobility remained constant across the sample period.
The equal opportunity matrix is defined as TEO,c(rk, rp) = 1r = 0.1. I use this simulated transition
matrix as my results in Chapter 1 show that relative mobility plays only a small role in determining
absolute mobility. In the absence of appropriate data to construct actual transition matrices for
each year, I choose to work with a simulated matrix.
2. MARGINAL DISTRIBUTIONS: For a given birth cohort, I calculate deciles in the outcome
variable of the children or parents using their outcome distribution. Then, I take the average of
the outcome variable within each decile to construct the marginal distribution.
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2.4. DATA
I use data from two surveys in this study: The Family Resources Survey (FRS) and the Family
Expenditure Survey (FES). These two surveys are used together for the construction of several
national statistics.
The FRS is a continuous representative household survey, starting from 1994-95, that covers
questions on a wide range of topics relating to households’ financial circumstances including
receipt of Social Security benefits, housing costs, assets and savings. The primary purpose of the
FRS is to inform the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) on social welfare policies. The
FRS sampled about 25,000 households each year until 2011-12, when it was reduced to 20,000. I
use all waves of the FRS to construct the marginal earnings and income distributions for children.
The FES4, also discussed in Chapter 1, is also a nationally representative household survey
that started in 1968 and collects data on income and expenditures. As the primary purpose of
the FES is to generate the basket of goods for the construction of the Consumer Price Index
(CPI), it is a reliable source of information for consumption data. The FES sampled about 7,000
households until 2008, after which it was about 5,500. I use the FES to construct: (1) the marginal
distributions of earnings, incomes and consumption of fathers and parents, and, (2) the marginal
consumption distribution for children.
2.4.1. Sample Definitions
My base unit of analysis is a household defined as an adult, their partner5 (if any), and their
children6 (if any). The base sample for children and parents consists of households where at least
one adult member, excluding children, are 30 years old7. Households are only included if at
least one adult member reported financial information. About 21 percent of the FRS sample and
4 From 2001, the FES and the National Food Surveys (NFS) were combined to create the Expenditure and Food
Survey. Subsequently in 2008, the EFS came to be known as the Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS). I refer to
the FES and its successors, EFS and LCFS, as the FES.
5 Partner includes husband/wife, co-habiting and civil partners.
6 Children may include adults as well. However, the adult children cannot be the household heads.
7 To help with the sample size, I consider ages 25 to 35 as being 30 on average.
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percent of the FES sample satisfied this requirement.
Children are defined as all households satisfying the above requirements in the FRS8. This is
a total of about 118,000 households across 24 years. As the survey years run from 1994-2017, the
birth cohorts of 30-year-olds are between 1964 and 1987. Their earnings and income information
are available for the years 1994-2017. Roughly 32 percent of the households in the children’s
sample include one member only.
Parents include all households satisfying the age requirements as stated above from the FES
(1968-2000). There is a total of 79,000 parent households across the years 1968 to 2000. Only 23
percent of this sample are single. Parents9 in my analysis refer to statistical parents, i.e. individuals
or couples who had a child between 1964-1987, about 52 percent of all households. I match
parents to children using this birth cohort information. This includes parents from the years
1968-1988 of the FES.
2.4.2. Variable Definitions
In this section, I define the key variables used to measure absolute mobility. All monetary variables
are measured in pound sterling in 2016 prices using the CPI. In my baseline specification, I do
not equivalise earnings, incomes or consumption. However, I address this issue in the robustness
checks in the Appendix.
1. EARNINGS: Earnings is defined the same way as in Chapter 110, i.e. the returns from
employment and self-employment at the individual level. Earnings data is available between
1968-2017.
8 An exception is when constructing the marginal distribution for consumption. For that, I define children in the
FES 1994-2017.
9 Fathers are defined in the same manner. I use individual statistics in my analysis in Chapter 1, and detail the
requirements there.
10 I do not construct any new measure using earnings in this chapter, and simply use the data from Chapter 1 for all
my analysis.
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2. GROSS AND NET INCOMES: Gross income is the sum of earnings and incomes from
non-labour sources such as investments, private transfers such as bonuses from employment and,
government transfers. Net income is gross income less taxes and national insurance contributions.
Gross and net income refers to the aggregate income of the household head and partner (if any).
Gross income is available between 1968-1988 for the parents, and 1994-2017 for the children.
Net income is available for the same duration for the parents, but only between 1996-2017 for the
children.
4. CONSUMPTION: Following Blundell and Etheridge (2010), consumption is defined as the
total expenditure on non-durables only. Including durables in the definition of consumption is
inappropriate because the purchase of durables and its consumption do not necessarily coincide.
Moreover, households may choose to delay replacement or purchase of durables as an insurance
mechanism against future shocks (Blundell, Low, and Preston, 2011). Consumption information
is available between 1986-198811 for parents and 1994-2017 for children.
2.4.3. Key Statistics
Here, I present the growth rate and inequality of outcomes in my main sample.
1. GROWTH RATE OF OUTCOMES: Figure 2.1 plots the growth in real weekly mean incomes
at the household level in panel (a) and as a comparison, the growth rates in earnings (featured
in Chapter 1) in panel (b). The x-axis for this figure is the birth cohort12 of children, based on
which the parent and children samples are matched. The parent sample is drawn from the FES,
11 Consumption information is consistently recorded for the construction of the CPI from 1988. I match these
categories to the years 1986 and 1987 as well. However, the expenditures for the years prior show major
discrepancies in trend.
12 The year of earnings can be found by adding 30 to the birth cohort. For example, children who were born in
1964 reported their outcomes in 1994. It is more complex for parents. Each birth cohort refers to several years
of outcomes for parents. For example, the 1964 birth cohort includes the years 1968-1980, with the year 1968
making up 20 percent of that cohort.
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Figure 2.1.: The evolution of real weekly incomes and earnings
Source: FES (1968 - 2000), FRS(1994 - 2017), QLFS (1993-2018).
Growth rates in real weekly mean individual earnings and household incomes.
Sample includes 30-year-old individuals, or households with at least one adult aged
30. Prices adjusted using the CPI.
and the children sample from FRS and QLFS respectively13.
The striking feature in both panels is that while parents’ outcomes continued to grow,
children’s outcomes began to decline after 2008 (birth cohort of 1978). The growth in income was
faster than the growth in earnings for both groups, although noticeably more so among children.
For example, children’s earnings were 1.16 times higher than in 1998, while incomes were 1.26
times higher - a difference of 10 percentage points. Moreover, the fall in income was milder than
that of earnings. In 2014 (birth cohort of 1984), earnings were only 1.14 times higher than at the
start of the period, while income was about 1.29 times higher. In short, incomes grew faster than
earnings, and declined by a smaller magnitude compared to earnings for both groups.
13 The FRS and QLFS are both representative surveys and as such, generate similar statistics. I use the QLFS here for
consistency from Chapter 1. In the Appendix, I show that the growth rate in individual earnings are approximately
equal in the FRS and the QLFS.
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Figure 2.2.: The evolution of real weekly consumption
Source: FES (1988 - 2017).
Real weekly mean household consumption, indexed to 1978 brith cohort, for
households with an adult member aged 25-35 years. Consumption is reported in
2016 pound, adjusted for inflation using the CPI.
Figure 2.2 plots the growth rate in consumption for parents and children. An issue with the
series on consumption is that the parent sample is very small, leading to a shorter time-series and
much noisier estimates compared to the other two outcomes. In the future, I plan to extend the
series farther back and make a more comprehensive comparison. Consumption does not show the
same pattern as earnings and income among children or parents - it declined by about 6 percent
between 1976 and 1982 among parents, and then began to rise again. Children, on the other hand,
experienced an almost consistent decline in consumption throughout the period. The magnitude
of the decline is also worse. In 1982 consumption was down by 10 percent, four percentage points
lower than among parents.
2. INEQUALITY IN OUTCOMES: I report the Gini coefficients for each of the three outcomes in
Table 2.1 for every half decade available in my sample. Rapid increases in inequality are evident
in both the individual earnings and incomes of parents, with levels of inequality being slightly
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higher in earnings than in income. The level of inequality among children was higher in both
earnings and incomes, but the trend was relatively stable. Due to the shorter period of available
data for consumption, and the smaller sample sizes, the inequality estimates for consumption are
less reliable. However, we see that the level of inequality in consumption was higher among
children compared to parents. In addition, consumption inequality grew more slowly and is at a
lower level compared to income for both children and parents, consistent with the findings of
Blundell and Etheridge (2010) and Blundell (2014).
Table 2.1.: Gini coefficient in earnings, income and consumption
Birth Cohort Income Earning Consumption
Parents Children Parents Children Parents Children
1965 0.24 0.36 0.18 0.33
1970 0.24 0.38 0.19 0.35
1975 0.26 0.36 0.20 0.32 0.27 0.33
1980 0.30 0.36 0.21 0.33 0.29 0.35
1985 0.34 0.36 0.25 0.33 0.30 0.34
1987 0.35 0.35 0.24 0.31 0.29 0.35
Source: FES (1968-2017), FRS (1994-2017), QLFS (1993-2017)
2.5. RESULTS
In examining the well-being of families, ‘[t]he conceptual issues strongly favour consumption,
while reporting issues tend to favour income...’ (Meyer and Sullivan, 2003). With this in mind, I
first discuss my baseline results for absolute mobility in earnings and incomes - the two variables
that are similar in nature, and are better reported - and then, the results using consumption. I also
describe the trends in absolute mobility across the deciles before and after the Great Recession.
Next, I highlight the changes between earnings and income at the individual and household
level, and also present results disaggregated by women and men. In the appendix, I evaluate
the robustness of my results to various effects, such as life-cycle bias, changes in family size and
composition, sampling errors, and an alternate price index.
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2.5.1. Earnings, Incomes and Consumption
Figure 2.3 presents the evolution of absolute earnings, income and consumption mobility between
1994-201714. Absolute mobility in earnings is a comparison at the individual level between the
fathers15 and children (and is a replication of my results from Chapter 1), while absolute mobility
in incomes and consumption are at the household level between parents and children. I do not
equivalise any measure so that the evolution in absolute mobility encompasses the changes in
family demographics over time16. Earnings and incomes are adjusted for inflation using the CPI.
My sample includes households with at least one adult member, excluding children, aged 30.
Absolute earnings mobility is discussed in some detail in Chapter 1, and therefore I summarise
the findings here. Earnings reflect the market returns to individual skills, and can be thought of
as the foundation for understanding the dynamics of absolute mobility. Earnings mobility was
gradually increasing in the 1990s and early-2000s among 30-year-olds in the UK, but since the
Great Recession has fallen sharply. Over the last decade, absolute earnings mobility fell by about
18 percentage points. In 2017, only about 33 percent of children match or exceed the earnings of
their fathers.
From earnings at the individual level, I move to incomes at the household level. The series for
gross income is shown in red and for net income in yellow. Quite like absolute earnings mobility,
absolute mobility in terms of gross and net income both trend upwards until the mid-2000s, and
then begin their descent. However, absolute income mobility differs from earnings mobility in
two key aspects. First, absolute income mobility is much higher in levels than earnings mobility
across all years. In 1994, for example, absolute income mobility was 62 percent, i.e. 14 percentage
14 Consumption mobility is only available between 2008-2017. This is because consistent estimates of expenditure
categories are available from 1988-2017. This significantly cuts short the available years for the parents’ sample.
After matching the parents to children using the birth cohorts, I have at least 200 observations for parents starting
from 2008.
15 Blundell and Etheridge (2010) show that there labour force participation among women around child-bearing
almost 30 percentage points lower in 1975 and 1985 compared to the subsequent decades. I therefore focus only
on fathers when making individual comparisons with children.
16 As family sizes and compositions have changed over time, this could potentially alter my baseline results. As shown
in the Appendix B.2.2, equivalising the outcomes raises the level of absolute mobility but does make a difference
to the trend.
48
CHAPTER 2. ABSOLUTE MOBILITY IN HOUSEHOLDS
Figure 2.3.: Absolute mobility in earnings, incomes and consumption
Source: FES (1968 - 2017), FRS (1994 - 2017), QLFS (1993-2017)
Earning replicate the estimates from Chapter 1, using individual labour earnings of
fathers and children. Gross and net income compare the respective measure among
children and parents. Gross income includes labour earnings, other incomes, private
and state benefits. Net incomes are gross incomes, less taxes and national insurance
contributions. Consumption is the sum of all services consumed by a household.
All measures are deflated using the CPI. No equivalization has been used. Children
and parents (fathers) are 30 years old when reporting the outcome.
points higher than absolute earnings mobility. Second, although both measures faced a decline
over the last decade, absolute income mobility has fallen at a much slower rate. Compared to the
18 percentage point decline in earnings mobility between 2007-2017, absolute income mobility
is only 8 percentage points lower. In 2017, more than 61 percent of children match or exceed
their parents’ gross incomes (62 percent when comparing net incomes), significantly higher than
the level of absolute earnings mobility.
In fact, absolute income mobility in the UK is comparatively higher than in the US and
in Canada. Chetty, Grusky, et al. (2017) showed that absolute income mobility in the US was
about 90 percent in the 1970s and declined consistently over the next 40 years. In 2014, absolute
income mobility in the US was only 50 percent. On the other hand, I find that absolute income
mobility actually increased between 1994 and 2005 in the UK, and even at the end of the period,
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absolute income mobility was higher compared to the US. Ostrovsky (2017) report absolute
income mobility estimates for Canada, using parent-child linked income data. Absolute income
mobility was about 50 percent in 2000 and rose by about 5 percentage points in the mid-2000s,
remaining there even in 2014. Although the level of absolute income mobility is lower in Canada
compared to the UK, it is interesting to note that Canada did not experience the dramatic fall
in mobility common to both the US and the UK. Therefore, while UK enjoys higher levels of
absolute mobility in recent years, it is not clear if it will continue to do so in the years to come
based on these trends.
Absolute consumption mobility is only available between 2006-2017 and shows the slowest
decline among the three outcomes. Over the last decade, consumption mobility fell by only three
percentage points17. However, in terms of levels, absolute mobility in consumption is much lower
than that of income. In 2017, about 47 percent of children consume as much or more than the
parents. This is about halfway between absolute earnings and income mobility. What could be
driving this difference? There are two potential reasons behind the level gap in absolute mobility
in terms of income and consumption. Income equals consumption expenditure and savings. If
households in recent years are saving a larger part of their income, then the level of consumption
mobility would be lower than that of income mobility. In light of the negative shock to earnings
during the Great Recession, such precautionary savings behaviour sounds viable. The other
reason relates to the way in which I measure consumption. Consumption in this analysis includes
non-durable expenditures only. However, housing costs, a type of durable good, have increased
significantly over the decades. In the 1940s, housing costs accounted for about 10 percent of net
incomes (Cribb, Hood, and Joyce, 2016); in the 1980s, it is now more than 20 percent (and about
25 percent among renters). This implies that excluding expenditures on durables under-estimates
consumption among children to a greater extent than it does for parents. As a result, my estimates
of absolute consumption mobility are lower than that of absolute income mobility. Without more
information on the trends before the Great Recession, it is difficult to conclude on the exact reason;
17 In the Appendix B.2.3, I show that this decline is not significant.
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I hope to pursue this avenue in future research.
CHANGES ACROSS THE DISTRIBUTION: In the previous section, I presented the average absolute
mobility estimates in each year for the three outcomes. In Figure 2.4, I present the average annual
change in absolute mobility at each decile before and after the Great Recession. As seen in Figure
2.3, absolute mobility estimates declined after the Great Recession for all outcomes, but it is not
clear if this change was uniform across the distribution or discriminatory across the different parts
of the distribution. Once again, the unit of analysis for earnings is at the individual level, while
that of income and consumption are at the household level. As it is easier to outmatch parents
whose outcomes are at the lower end of the distribution than those who perform at the higher
end, absolute mobility is always higher at the lower deciles than at the top. The panel on the
right shows the trends prior to the Great Recession, and the panel on the left shows the trends
afterwards.
Figure 2.4.: Average annual change in absolute mobility by income decile
Source: FES (1968 - 2000), FRS (1994 - 2017), QLFS (1994-2018)
Average annual change is estimated by taking the average of the yearly growth (or
fall) in absolute mobility at each decile for each outcome.
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Before the Great Recession, both absolute earnings and income mobility18 increased by just
under one percent annually in all but the top two deciles, with the rate of increase highest at the
bottom of the distribution. After the Great Recession, the changes are more dramatic. Absolute
earnings mobility declined across the earnings distribution, with the upper half experiencing some
of the highest levels. Absolute income mobility also declined but at a much slower rate. At the
median decile, for example, absolute income mobility fell by just under one percent annually,
while absolute earnings mobility decreased by about three percent annually. Evidently, the decline
in absolute consumption mobility is much lower (the average trend was relatively flatter as shown
in Figure 2.3). However, absolute consumption mobility actually fell at a slower rate at the upper
part of the consumption distribution, quite unlike the trends for earnings and income mobility.
In Section B.2, I show that my results are robust to several technical challenges: (1) Life-cycle
bias, (2) equivalisation to account for changes in family size, (3) sampling errors, and (4) alternate
price deflator. In particular, the estimates of absolute income mobility at age 40 follow roughly the
same trend as that at age 30, signifying that the baseline results do not suffer from life-cycle bias. I
also equivalise household income and consumption using the two different scales to understand
the impact of the changing family size and composition on the baseline estimates. I find that
equivalisation increases the level of absolute income and consumption mobility, but does not alter
the trends in either. I account for sampling errors using bootstrap analysis. Finally, I also estimate
decile-specific inflation index to account for the variation in consumption bundles across the
income distribution. Using this alternate price deflator also does not affect my main conclusions.
2.5.2. The Role of Insurance Mechanisms
Two trends are highlighted in Figure 2.3. Absolute earnings mobility is lower in levels and has
experienced a sharper decline over the last decade compared to absolute income mobility. There
are two differences in how I define earnings and income: (1) earnings includes returns from
employment only, while income is a composite measure of all sources of earnings, including
18 I exclude consumption as I do not observe it for the entire 1994-2007 period, only for 2006 and 2007.
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transfers, and (2) earnings are measured at the individual level, while income is at the household
level. Figure 2.5 illustrates how these two differences explain the differential trends in absolute
mobility.
Figure 2.5.: Absolute mobility in individual earnings, individual incomes
and household incomes
Source: FES (1968 - 2000), FRS (1994 - 2017)
Individual earning estimates compare labour earnings and income of 30-year-old
fathers with 30-year-old children. Household (HH) income compare the incomes
among parents and the children’s families. All measures are deflated using the CPI.
No equivalization has been used.
I first compare absolute earnings mobility with absolute income mobility, both defined at
the individual level. In terms of trends, the fall in mobility levels over the last decade is also
approximately equal at about 18 percentage points between these two measures. The main
changes to employment during the Great Recession took place at the intensive margin in the UK.
Productivity during the economic downturn was already poor in the UK, and reflected in the low
levels of business investment (Gregg, Machin, and Fernández-Salgado, 2014). Firms employed
extra workers, as labour costs were relatively more attractive than investment, thus preserving
employment (Gregg, Machin, and Fernández-Salgado, 2014). Thus, employment levels were
high but earnings, and consequently incomes, were low during and after the Great Recession.
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In other words, there was very little individuals could do to prevent the fall in these outcomes.
The main difference between absolute earnings and income mobility at the individual level is
in levels. Absolute income mobility is higher than absolute earnings mobility, and this is due to
the additional sources of income. There were large increases in social assistance between 1997
and 2010, including more generous out-of-work safety nets for families with children, although
means-tested working-age transfers underwent broad-based cuts as part of the fiscal consolidation
measures from 2011 (Blundell, Joyce, et al., 2018). In addition, as many transfer payments are
not contingent on work, most households have experienced strong income growths (Blundell,
Joyce, et al., 2018). The reason we do not observe a differential trend in the downward decline is
because the fall after the Great Recession is generated by the fall in individual earnings. Without a
corresponding rise in the transfers to offset the decrease in earnings, the trends between individual
income and earnings mobility remains the same.
From the individual level, we now move to the household level. Between individual income
mobility and household income mobility, there are differences in both trend and levels. The
fall in absolute household income mobility was only 8 percentage points compared to 18 for
individual income mobility. Within families, a negative earnings shock for one half of the couple
can be offset by a positive shock for the other. Women’s earnings enjoyed tremendous growth,
especially at the lower end of the income distribution. For example, women’s earnings at the
20th percentile grew by around 60 percent between 1994-2015 (Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston,
2008). On the other hand, men’s earnings grew at a much lower rate, and actually declined at
the lower end of the income distribution. For example, at the 20th percentile of men’s earnings,
the growth was close to zero. Low-educated men have, in fact, experienced the lowest growth in
earnings (Blundell, Joyce, et al., 2018). Given that individuals with low levels of education are
increasingly sorting into homogeneous marriages (Eika, Mogstad, and Zafar, 2017), this implies
that the growth in women’s earnings helped offset a large part of the fall in men’s earnings, keeping
absolute income mobility high. Dual-income households have therefore played a major role in
raising and stabilising the level of absolute mobility in household income.
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2.5.3. Dierences between Women and Men
I use two different surveys for children and for parents. This implies that I cannot match children
to their actual parents, only to their statistical parents. As a result, there is no right way of assigning
a household as belonging to the ’daughter’ or the ’son’. However, Figure 2.6 shows that there must
have been some differences in the outcome trend across women and men that when aggregated at
the household level compensated for the negative shock. In Figure 2.6, I analyse absolute income
mobility across genders at an individual level.
On the top panel, the figure presents the average absolute income mobility across the years
between father-daughter, father-son and father-child pairs. This panel illustrates the differential
experience by gender. On the bottom panel, I present the disaggregated trend in absolute mobility
between father-daughter pairs on the left and between father-sons on the right. The income
deciles in the bottom panel refer to the income of the parents. Thus, children from lower income
deciles imply children whose parental incomes were at the lower end of the distribution. I cannot
comment on the eventual match of these individuals (if any) as I do not observe them across time,
but the bottom panel of this figure sheds light on the possible experiences as households.
The average absolute income mobility between 1994-2017 is a replication of the individual
income trend shown in 2.5. Absolute income mobility is higher among men than women
throughout the 24 years analysed here. In 1994, more than 71 percent of men earned as much or
more than the fathers compared to only 40 percent of women. This gap converged over time, and
in 2008, we see that 69 percent of men and 55 percent of women experience upward absolute
mobility. It must be noted that during the 1994-2008 period, absolute income mobility among
men was relatively stable while that of women was increasing, giving rise to the overall upward
trend of absolute mobility. Following the Great Recession, absolute income mobility declined
among both groups. In 2017, 54 percent of men and 40 percent of women enjoy upward absolute
income mobility.
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Figure 2.6.: Absolute mobility in individual incomes
Source: FES (1968 - 2000), FRS (1994 - 2017)
Income decile refers to parental income. The top panel presents average absolute
income mobility for each year, while the bottom panel shows the disaggregated
statistics. The bottom right panel compares women’s earnings with the father’s and
the bottom left, men’s earnings with the father’s. All individuals are on average 30
years old. All measures are deflated using the CPI. No equivalization has been used.
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The UK legislated its Equal Pay Act in 197019 to prevent discrimination in pay or working
conditions of men and women. The stark difference in the absolute mobility experience shows
that a lot more work needs to be done both at the formal labour market and within families to
ensure women are not being left behind across generations. A possible counter-argument to
women experiencing worse mobility than men could be that at age 30, women are more involved
in familial responsibilities of child-rearing and therefore, accept lower pay for greater flexibility.
In the Appendix, I present the same figure for women who have no children at age 30, and all
women (with or without children) at age 40 (Figure B.8). These results are insightful in terms
of family status affecting women’s absolute mobility experience but do not explain away the gap
presented here. In fact, the level of absolute mobility among the baseline sample of 30 year old
women is higher than that of 30 year old women without children across all years, and also higher
than that of 40 year old women prior to 2010 (the two series converge after that). Further research
is required to understand the reasons behind these differences.
The bottom panel of Figure 2.5 shows the absolute income mobility for each decile among
women and men. The colours go from blue to red to indicate lower income deciles to upper
income deciles for both and men. First, women from all but the top decile experienced growing
absolute income mobility up until at least 2004, and even until 2009 for those at the bottom half of
the income distribution. In contrast, men from the lower income deciles had a very high level of
absolute income mobility, but did not experience the same kind of growth (not applicable to the
first decile who were already at the maximum) for the period, 1994-2004. Men did enjoy growing
mobility, but only if they were from the upper half of the income distribution, excluding the very
top. Thus, the growth in average absolute mobility highlighted in Figure 2.3 was brought about
by the overall growth among women (except the very top) and men from higher-than-average
income brackets. At the top decile, which is unique in its trend, both men and women face an
almost constant decline, but the magnitude is much stronger among men.
19 This was superseded by the Equality Act in 2010, which expands the definition to include discrimination based on
religion or belief, sexual orientation and age.
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After the Great Recession, women across almost the whole income distribution faced a
declining trend (the top and bottom experienced no change). On the other hand, men at the
bottom two income deciles continued to enjoy high level of unchanged absolute income mobility.
The remaining deciles also suffered from the fall. At the median, both men and women experienced
the same magnitude of fall in absolute income mobility of about 15 percentage points. However,
this fall worsens for men at the top (e.g. 30 and 24 percent for men and women at the 9th decile
respectively). Although not disaggregated by gender, Costa and Machin (2017) find that decline
in earnings after the Great Recession was more pronounced in the upper half of the income
distribution compared to the bottom. I discuss these trends in greater detail in Chapter 1. Part of
the differential trends across the distribution could be explained by the choice of the price deflator.
Consumption varies across different parts of the distribution, which implies that the actual price
inflation faced also differ. I address this issue by using decile-specific price index in the Appendix
B.2, and find that the trends persist regardless of the price index used. In short, the fall in absolute
mobility was somewhat mitigated by men from the bottom two income deciles and women from
the bottom deciles.
2.5.4. Alternate Definitions of Absolute Mobility
Regardless of the normative objective, it is difficult to conclude that a single definition of absolute
mobility is the ’right’ one (Fields and Ok, 1999). Just like there are multiple measures of inequality,
there are multiple ways of estimating absolute mobility. I present two alternatives here and compare
it with my baseline measure for income and consumption. The added benefit of computing these
measures are that both can be computed directly from cross-sectional household surveys, and
neither require assumptions on relative mobility.
The first alternative calculates the proportion of children that have higher incomes than
the median of their parents’ generation in a given cohort (Katz and Krueger, 2017). Figure 2.7
presents the results. The baseline and alternative absolute mobility measures move in tandem for
each outcome respectively. The only difference is in levels. Absolute mobility is higher using the
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alternative definition. This is because some children who may not earn (or consume) as much
parents in the top deciles do earn more than the median parent, pushing the level of absolute
mobility upwards. In contrast, Katz and Krueger (2017) estimate lower levels of absolute mobility
using this alternate definition compared to the baseline measure reported by Chetty, Grusky, et al.
(2017). This is because of the difference in the level of inequality between the UK and the US; the
real median income of the parents in the US are actually higher than that of the children (Chetty,
Grusky, et al., 2017).
Figure 2.7.: Absolute mobility in median incomes
Source: FES (1968 - 2017), FRS (1994 - 2017)
The alternative absolute mobility is defined as the fraction of children whose real
weekly incomes match or exceed the real weekly median incomes of their parents’
generation. Baseline results are a replication of Figure 2.3.
The second alternative measures the ratio of real weekly median income of the children’s
generation to the real weekly median income of the parents’ generation. This is a more summary
measure than the previous two definitions, and reflects the experience of the ’typical’ household as
the median is resilient to increased skewness to the right tail of the outcome distribution. A median
ratio of one indicates there has been no change to the median income between the children and
the parents. Economic growth that affects the medians increases the ratio to more than one. Figure
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2.8 presents the results for incomes and consumption.
Figure 2.8.: Absolute mobility in median incomes
Source: FES (1968 - 2017), FRS (1994 - 2017)
The ratio is calculated by dividing the real median weekly income of children in a
given cohort with the real median weekly income of the parents’ cohort.
The median ratio follows a different scale to baseline absolute mobility and is therefore not
directly comparable. However, the median ratio of incomes and consumption show a declining
trend from 2005, and there is a persistent gap in the median ratio of income and consumption,
both features of the baseline trends. Between 2007 and 2017, the median ratio fell from 1.71 to
1.33 for income, and from 1.16 to only 1.04 for consumption. In other words, the real weekly
median consumption among children in 2018 is no different from that of their parents. Chetty,
Grusky, et al. (2017) report a median ratio of less than one in recent years in the US, indicating
that the real median incomes of children in the US in recent years are lower than the real median
incomes of the parents.
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2.6. CONCLUSION
This chapter documented the evolution of absolute mobility in income and consumption among
30-year-olds in the UK for the period 1994-2017. I compare the baseline results in this chapter
with the change in absolute earnings mobility reported in Chapter 1. Evaluating the trends across
all three outcomes provides a comprehensive picture of the dynamics of absolute mobility. I
find that absolute income mobility, like absolute earnings mobility declined over the last decade.
However, the fall in absolute income mobility was only about 8 percentage points, much lower
than that of absolute earnings mobility. Moreover, the levels of absolute income mobility are also
higher. In 2018, absolute income mobility was about 28 percentage points higher than absolute
earnings mobility at 61 percent. In contrast, absolute consumption mobility was only 47 percent
in 2017, and declined by only three percentage points over the last decade.
Earnings, income and consumption reflect different dimensions of absolute mobility, and no
single measure accurately reflects welfare, particularly in light of the measurement issues. The
link between absolute mobility in earnings and in income is mediated by a variety of insurance
mechanisms that help individuals and households mediate shocks to earnings. I find that absolute
mobility in individual incomes was higher in levels compared to absolute mobility in earnings,
signifying the role of non-labour income and social welfare transfers. However, both series
experienced the same sharp fall in earnings over the last decade. Next, I compare absolute mobility
in household income and in individual income. The gap between these two series highlights the
role of family, in particular of the family labour supply. The tremendous growth in women’s
earnings propped up household income in dual-income families. This in turn raised the average
level of absolute mobility in household incomes. The relation between absolute mobility in income
and consumption is more complex and is possibly due to precautionary savings behaviour and a
rise in housing costs among the children’s generation, which changed the share of income spent
on durables and non-durables.
While women’s earnings were especially helpful in mitigating shocks at the household level,
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I find that absolute mobility in individual incomes among women still lag behind that of men.
The gap had been on a declining trend prior to 2005 when women’s earnings grew across the
distribution and men’s earnings grew only at the top two deciles. The gap appears to be stable in
recent years, and is robust to considering different age groups and including only women with no
children.
In summary, the fall in earnings following the Great Recession at a time when employment
levels were high bore serious consequences on absolute earnings mobility. Individuals alone were
not able to mitigate this negative shock as reflected in absolute mobility of individual incomes. This
also halted the convergence in absolute mobility levels between men and women. Dual-income
households, however, were able to smooth outcomes to a large degree. As a result, absolute
mobility in income and consumption remained high and comparatively smoother.
In this chapter, I take the view that neither income nor consumption accurately reflects
welfare, particularly in light of the different measurement issues. These measurement issues
also make it difficult to conclude why the level of absolute consumption mobility is lower than
that of income mobility. Extending the trend of absolute consumption mobility farther back
would provide some indication of the reason behind this difference. In addition, it would be
very interesting to understand the role played by housing in determining absolute consumption
mobility. These are some of the avenues that are on the agenda for future research.
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MANAGING EARLY-LIFE CLIMATE SHOCKS: EVIDENCE
FROM THE 1998 FLOOD IN BANGLADESH
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Extreme weather events are likely to increase in frequency and magnitude due to climate change
(Mirza, 2011), threatening food security and compromising the livelihoods of the most vulnerable,
particularly in developing countries (FAO, 2015) and with a disproportionately large effect on
children (Rodriguez-Llanes et al., 2011; Health, 2015). Such events can cause permanent negative
change in the physiology and metabolism of children, especially if they are in utero1(Barker,
1990) or in their infancy2 (Almond and Currie, 2011; Rasmussen, 2001; Lucas, 2007). South
Asia is already characterised by high levels of underweight children below the age of five (FAO,
2015), and is also home to more than half of all children that suffer from impaired growth and
development due to poor nutrition, infectious diseases, etc. (WHO, 2017). To prevent an increase
in this phenomenon due to extreme weather events, it is essential to identify possible responses
that can mitigate the effect of such negative shocks.
In this chapter, I study the effect of one such shock - the 1998 flood in Bangladesh - on
1 This effect is known as the ‘foetal origins’ hypothesis (Barker, 1990) which focuses on in utero insults and states
that negative shocks to the mother while a child is in utero can lead to a permanent negative change in the child’s
physiology and metabolism.
2 The infancy is known as the critical period of development’, can result in ‘... permanent or long-term change in
the structure and functioning of the organism’ (Almond and Currie, 2011; Rasmussen, 2001; Lucas, 2007).
63
CHAPTER 3. MANAGING EARLY-LIFE CLIMATE SHOCKS
children’s anthropometry and mother’s breastfeeding behaviour. Floods are an annual occurrence
in Bangladesh but the one in 1998 is recorded as one of the worst in the country’s history in
terms of both the depth of inundation and also the duration (Sarraf, Dasgupta, and Adams, 2011;
Khandker, 2007). The flood began in July 1998 and ended 11 weeks later in September 1998, and
at its peak, inundated more than 50 of the 64 districts of Bangladesh (Hofer and Messerli, 2006;
del Ninno and Lundberg, 2005). Although the flood-related loss to the GDP was estimated at two
billion US dollars, the macroeconomic recovery was rather quick (Khandker, 2007). In addition,
as I show in this paper, even among children who are more vulnerable to such events, there
was surprisingly minimal effect. I apply the difference-in-difference framework to understand
the impact of early-life negative shocks, exploiting the 1998 flood as a natural experiment for
my identification strategy. I use data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), 2000
and 2007. The first difference in this design is the birth month-year of the child and the second
difference is the birth location of the child.
I estimate the effect of the flood on the duration of breastfeeding. I find that flood-affected
children are 59 percent less likely to be weaned in any given month compared to unaffected
children. This effect is more pronounced for flood-affected children from districts that sustained
monsoon rice crop losses of up to 45 percent. Moreover, I find that there was no significant
difference in the duration that treatment girls or boys were breastfed. My research has not found
any other study that has studied the impact of early-life shocks on breastfeeding behaviour, even
though it is a critical measure in preventing such shocks from leading to childhood malnutrition
(WHO, 2017). Breastfeeding also offers protection against common infectious diseases such as
diarrhoea (Feachem and Koblinsky, 1984), which are more prevalent in areas with contaminated
food and water sources (Habicht, DaVanzo, and Butz, 1988). These benefits were particularly
applicable to children below 1 year of age (Feachem and Koblinsky, 1984). However, children
between 12-35 months old who were breastfed for longer scored slightly lower in the weight-for-
age measure than completely weaned children in Bangladesh, but they were also at significantly
lower risk of death (Filteau, 2000). There is no incidence of deaths in either groups (affected or
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unaffected) in my sample, and as I discuss next, children did score lower in the weight-for-age
z-score.
Next, I investigate the effect of the flood on children’s anthropometry, an outcome measure.
I find that the flood has had no effect on stunting, but has increased wasting by 7.5 percent among
children affected by the flood relative to those unaffected. Incidences of wasting were significant
in districts with large amounts of monsoon rice crop loss. There was no gender-disparity in
either of these outcome measures. I further examine if the flood had differential impact across the
weight distribution. I find that children affected by the flood with weight-for-age z-scores in the
10th, 25th, 50th and 75th quantiles suffered between 0.159-0.272 standard deviations lower scores
compared to unaffected children. However, children affected by the flood but with weight-for-age
z-score in the 90th quantile were not significantly different from those unaffected. In other words,
weaker children were more likely to be negatively affected.
These results are different to other studies investigating the impact of early-life shocks on
children’s anthropometric measures and mortality. Several studies (Skoufias, Vinha, and Conroy,
2011; Rodriguez-Llanes et al., 2011; Caruso, 2015; Aguilar and Vicarelli, 2011) noted a negative
effect of a natural disaster and the consequent malnutrition on both height and weight of children.
In addition, Hernández-Julián, Mansour, and Peters (2014) found an increase in mortality and
higher likelihood of post-famine still-births for those who were pregnant during the famine
in Bangladesh. There are several reasons behind the discrepancy. The 1998 flood was shorter
in duration compared to the famine (Hernández-Julián, Mansour, and Peters, 2014). More
importantly, the country experienced bumper production in paddy immediately following the
flood, partly due to the sediment deposits from the flood (Khandker, 2007). Further, the last major
flood had occurred only a decade prior, and had been a valuable lesson. The government set
up massive disaster-management facilities specifically from the learnings of the 1988 flood. In
addition, there was rapid deployment of the Vulnerable Group Feeding program and expansions
of existing safety net programs, such as Food-for-Work, Test Relief, etc., including increased
availability of loans. These programs reinforced the coping mechanism among households and
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prevented the 1998 flood from having long-term catastrophic implications.
This paper highlights the role of small behavioural changes, such as increased breastfeeding,
coupled with immediate action by governmental and non-governmental agencies in mitigating
the effects of climate related disasters. Given that extreme weather events will increase in frequency
due to climate change, it is essential that governments adopt appropriate disaster response and
mitigation policies. Kiene (2004) points out, “A quarter-century of adjustments toward a more
rational policy mix, free political expression, a more liberal trade regime, and a flexible and
effective disaster response and mitigation certainly laid the foundation for this success story.” These
foundations need to be built in all countries susceptible to climate shocks, and further reinforced
with lessons from countries undergoing such crises.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the context of the 1998
flood in Bangladesh, Section 3 describes the data and the experiment design, and Section 4 presents
the empirical strategy and associated findings on duration of breastfeeding and anthropometric
measures. Finally, Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
3.2. CONTEXT
Bangladesh, with a population of 122 million and a gross national income of only USD 420 in
1998, is best classified as a densely populated lower middle income country (Bank, 2019). Often
also known as the country of rivers, the three major rivers in the country - the Ganges, the
Brahmaputra and the Meghna - form one of the world’s largest deltas by discharge, draining
a basin about 12 times its size annually. The delta occupies 32 percent of the country’s land
area, including the rivers. The country has a tropical monsoon climate with a heavy monsoon
which, combined with the low altitude in the major parts of the country, make floods an annual
occurrence. In fact, prior to the 1998 flood, there were at least four other major floods within the
last 50 years that caused serious damage to property and also had high level of casualties (Khandker,
2007). The 1998 flood was one of the worst recorded floods in Bangladesh’s history in terms of
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the depth of inundation and the duration (Sarraf, Dasgupta, and Adams, 2011; Khandker, 2007).
The 1998 flood started in July 1998 following an unusually strong monsoon coupled with a
very large draining of melt water from the Himalayas and ended 11 weeks later in September
(Hofer and Messerli, 2006). More than 50 of the 64 districts of Bangladesh were inundated during
the peak of the flood, affecting around 30 million people (Hofer and Messerli, 2006; del Ninno
and Lundberg, 2005). Figure 3.1 provides an illustration of the extent of flooding on the right
panel. The districts that experienced severe flooding were located along the major river courses,
while the southern and south-western districts remained largely safe.
Figure 3.1.: Flood affected regions in 1998 in Bangladesh
(a) Water level in Bangladesh, 1998 Flood (b) Level of Crop Damage
Source: Fergerstrom, Ul Mowla, and Khatun (2006) (right), and the GIS Project, BGD
/95/006, BARC (left)
The consequences of the flood were wide ranging, with reported casualties3, damage to
private properties, as well as damages to roads and infrastructure (see Hofer and Messerli, 2006
3 The exact figure is contentious with studies reporting anywhere between 700 to 2000 deaths (Hofer and Messerli,
2006; Khandker, 2007).
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for a detailed estimate of the damages). The net loss to the economy as a result of the flood was
estimated at approximately two billion US dollars (Mirza, 2011), around 9 percent of the country’s
GDP at the time (Khandker, 2007). However, the worst hit was the agricultural sector, where
the flood disrupted the harvest of the pre-monsoon rice crop, and prevented the planting of the
monsoon rice crop (Khandker, 2007). The left panel of Figure 3.1 highlights production losses for
the monsoon rice crop, T-aman, during the 1998 flood. The districts with the highest level of
production losses were located at the confluence of the three major rivers and are highlighted in
red.
Despite of being one of the most severe floods in Bangladesh, the post-flood assessment has
been surprisingly positive. The GDP growth for example was 5.6 percent in 1998 compared
to 5.9 percent in 1997. The bumper production of paddy following the flood, assistance from
government, non-governmental and international agencies, along with personal experiences in
previous floods all helped manage the after-effects. International organizations, such as the IDA
and IMF, provided emergency assistance of about USD 335 million to ensure that the country’s
budget deficit did not cut back on essential social expenditure (Khandker, 2007). The government
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) implemented a number of programs to mitigate
the effect of the flood. The Vulnerable Group Feeding program by the government provided
over four million households with 16 kg of food grains monthly during the flood and for several
months afterwards. Some existing programs such as Food-for-Work, Food for Education, Test
Relief and Gratuitous Relief were expanded. NGOs supplied free winter rice seeds to farmers,
and increased availability of loans, so that farming could recover quickly. Overall, these relief
efforts effectively reigned in starvation and disease spread due to the short sharp shock of the flood
(Khandker, 2007).
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3.3. DATA AND EXPERIMENT DESIGN
3.3.1. Data
My empirical analysis relies on two waves (2000 and 2007) of the Bangladesh Demographic and
Health Surveys (DHS), a nationally representative survey and conducted following two-stage
cluster sampling. In the first stage, the clusters are chosen using probability weights based on
location size and households in each cluster are listed. In the second stage, a fixed number of
households are chosen from the list using equal probability systemic sampling. The DHS reports
basic demographic characteristics of children (i.e. sex, birth order, date of birth, type of residence,
duration of residence), their family characteristics (i.e. parent’s education and occupation, number
of siblings), their mother’s demographic and health status (i.e. height), and several key outcomes,
such as breastfeeding duration, height-for-age, weight-for-height and weight-for-age z-scores.
For the 2000 and 2007 waves, the DHS also makes available on request district-level locations
for each household4. I restrict my sample to children whose location is identified at the time of the
survey and who are under 60 months of age. This is because the DHS only collects information
on breastfeeding duration, height-for-age, weight-for-height and weight-for-age z-scores of
children in that age group. As a result, the duration of breastfeeding is censored at 59 months.
The final sample contains just over 5,000 observations (approximately, five percent of the whole
survey).
3.3.2. Cohort Selection
The foetal origins hypothesis states that the impact of a negative shock is severe on children in
utero or under the age of two. Children who are two years old in July 1998 when the flood
started were born in July 1996; hence, this is the start date of the treatment cohort. Children who
are conceived at the end of the flood in September 1998 were born about 37 weeks later in June
4 This information is also available for the DHS 2004. However, the total sample size for children who satisfy the
cohort requirement (discussed later) is about 500. I therefore exclude this wave.
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19995. Thus the treatment or affected cohort comprises children born between July 1996 and
June 1999.
For the control or unaffected cohort, I use children who are born between July 2003 and June
2006. There are two reasons why this latter cohort can be considered as unaffected by the flood.
First, the Bangladesh economy recovered within a year after the flood, and therefore, children
born about five years afterwards should not show effects of the flood (Khandker, 2007). Second,
according to the foetal origins hypothesis, children who are not in utero or are above the age
of two at the time of the adverse shock are relatively unaffected (Almond, 2006). I do not use
a control group prior to the flood as I have insufficient data on children born before 19966. In
addition, using earlier cohorts would mean comparing children who are below two years in the
affected cohort and above two in the unaffected cohort.
The dummy variable Cohort thus takes the value one if the child belongs to any of the cohorts
affected by the flood (July 1996-June 1999) and zero, otherwise. This variable is the first difference
I use for my difference-in-difference framework.
3.3.3. Areas Aected
In the three months of the 1998 flood, 50 of the 64 districts of Bangladesh were inundated (as
shown in Figure 3.1). I construct the dummy variable Area that takes the value one if the child was
born in a district affected by the flood and zero7 otherwise. This makes the second difference for
my identification strategy. In addition, I ensure that the location reported in the survey is the same
as the location of birth of the child by including only those households who have lived at the same
location as reported by the survey as the number for at least as long as the child has been born.
This is about 75 percent of the sample. Further, there was no mass migration during the flood;
5 As data on duration of gestation is unavailable, I consider the 37 week gestation period.
6 The earliest birth cohort in my sample is 1995, which means that pre-flood control cohort would have children
who are one year old at maximum. This would harm the common support by creating an imbalance in the age
studied before and during or after the flood.
7 I consider a district as being unaected if it had no flooding and no crop damage (combination of both panels in
Figure 3.1). These districts were Panchagarh, Thakurgaon, Dinajpur, Meherpur, Chuadanga, Jhenaidah, Jessore,
Magura, Khagrachari, Rangamati and Bandarban.
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only about five percent of households migrated out of their villages due to the flood (Khandker,
2007). Thus, this second difference seems reasonably well identified. The most severely affected
districts were along the course of the three major rivers. I construct two dummy variables, High
andModerate that take the values one if the district experienced crop losses of up to 45 percent or
up to 30 percent respectively8.
3.3.4. Dierence-in-Dierence Design
Table 3.1 reports the design of my difference-in-difference framework. About 50 percent of
my sample belong to the affected birth cohort, and 88 percent were born in flood-affected areas.
Overall, 43 percent of all children were affected by the flood and the remaining were unaffected,
i.e. about 2,200 children were affected by the flood and just over 3,000 unaffected, for a total of
5,200 children (seven percent of DHS surveys).
Table 3.1.: Experiment Design
Mean
Cohort (=1 if in affected birth month-year) 0.499
Area (=1 if in affected district) 0.887
Damage Intensity
High (Production loss of up to 45 percent) 0.187
Moderate (Production loss of up to 30 percent) 0.699
No Flooding 0.113
Cohort*Area 0.430
Bangladesh DHS, 2000 and 2007. All observations are weighted by strata
and clusters to account for two-stage survey design.
3.3.5. Summary Statistics
The surveys I use were conducted two years after the 1998 flood. As a result, I do not have baseline
statistics and cannot verify the parallel paths assumption. Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics
of key variables according to flood-affected status of the children. The first panel reports children’s
8 These districts are highlighted in red for High and in yellow and pale green forModerate in Figure 3.1.
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statistics. On average, children are about 0.304 years (≈ three months) older in the affected group
compared to the unaffected. There is no statistical difference in the sex-ratios, which hovers
close to the natural sex-ratio for both groups. Children affected by the flood were at a higher
birth order, had more siblings relative to those unaffected. That the family sizes were larger is
possibly due to the government and NGO efforts to bring fertility into check. These measures
only affected the unaffected cohort, who were born later.
In terms of outcomes, around 70 percent of children were still being breastfed at the time of
the survey, highlighting that the duration of breastfeeding is censored to the right. On average,
children were breastfed slightly more in the unaffected group compared to the affected. The
height-for-age and weight-for-height z-score is a standardised measure calculated by taking the
difference between the child’s height (weight) and the median height (weight) of the reference
population and then normalizing it with the standard deviation of the height (weight) of the
reference population for the same age-sex. Stunting and wasting takes place if the height-for-age
and the weight-for-height z-scores are less than two respectively. Overall, children in Bangladesh
perform poorly for both height-for-age and weight-for-height z-score, generating the so-called
South Asian paradox - children in this part of the world have shorter statures relative to African
countries, even though income levels are higher.
Children in the affected group were slightly shorter, as indicated by the lower height-for-age
z-score, and more likely to be stunted relative to those unaffected. However, the level of stunting
is high for both groups, at around 40 and 49 percent respectively. On the other hand, weight-for-
height z-score and wasting was higher among the unaffected group, compared to the affected.
The proportion of wasting, too, is quite high by international standards.
Panel B lists several characteristics of the mothers. On average, mothers were about 26 years
old in both groups. However, the age at first birth was slightly higher in the unaffected group.
Both groups of mothers had very low educational qualifications. The average years of schooling
completed was about 4.5 and 3.1 years for unaffected and affected group, respectively, indicating
that neither group had completed primary school which takes about 5 years in Bangladesh. One
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Table 3.2.: Summary Statistics by Flood Status
Flood Status Mean Difference
Unaffected Affected Difference (Std Error)
Panel A: Children
Age (Yrs) 1.896 1.591 0.304*** (0.025)
Female 0.497 0.502 –0.004 (0.014)
Birth Order 2.702 3.060 –0.359*** (0.053)
No. of sisters 1.435 1.610 –0.175*** (0.036)
No. of brothers 1.403 1.598 –0.195*** (0.036)
Total siblings 2.838 3.208 –0.370*** (0.053)
At least 1 elder brother 0.491 0.557 –0.066*** (0.014)
Still Breastfed (at the time of survey) 0.644 0.718 –0.075*** (0.013)
Duration of Breastfeeding (Months) 23.19 20.52 2.666*** (0.256)
Height-for-Age z-score –1.713 –1.936 0.223*** (0.036)
Stunting (<2 Height-for-Age z-score) 0.404 0.485 –0.081*** (0.014)
Weight-for-Height z-score –1.240 –1.088 –0.152*** (0.025)
Wasting (<2 Weight-for-Height z-score) 0.190 0.132 0.058*** (0.010)
Panel B: Mothers
Age (Yrs) 25.80 25.96 –0.165 (0.172)
Age at First Birth (Yrs) 17.85 17.60 0.249*** (0.087)
Education (Yrs) 4.514 3.106 1.408*** (0.112)
No Schooling (=1 if 0 yrs of education) 0.319 0.484 –0.165*** (0.013)
Height (cm) 150.6 150.4 0.230 (0.153)
Panel C: Fathers
Education (Yrs) 4.404 3.970 0.435*** (0.130)
Farmer (=1 if employed in farming) 0.254 0.152 0.106*** (0.011)
Rural 0.315 0.262 0.053*** (0.013)
Bangladesh DHS, 2000, 2004 and 2007. All observations are weighted by strata and clusters to account for two-stage
survey design. Unaffected group consists of 3,151 children and affected group, 2,215.
reason for the higher educational qualifications among unaffected group could be the governmental
project to improve education of girls through free schooling. This is a time effect, which will be
differenced out. There were no significant differences in the height of mothers.
Panel C highlights fathers’ characteristics. The average years of schooling completed among
fathers was higher than that of mothers in the affected group, but once again, they had not
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completed primary schooling. A larger share worked in agriculture in the unaffected group
relative to the affected group. Around 32 and 26 percent of children from the unaffected and
affected groups resided in rural areas respectively.
3.4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
3.4.1. Impact on Duration of Breastfeeding
According to the foetal origins hypothesis, children who were in utero or were at most two years
of age at the time of the 1998 flood faced an adverse shock to their health and nutrition (Barker,
1990; Lucas, 2007). In this section, I analyse if mothers respond to such a shock by altering their
breastfeeding practices. The flood threatened children’s health in at least three ways: (a) increased
incidence of water-borne or vector-borne diseases (e.g. typhoid, cholera, malaria, dengue, etc), (b)
reduced availability of food for consumption, and (c) reduced income opportunities with which to
supplement food or improve living conditions. Breastfeeding is cited as a key preventive measure
against childhood malnutrition (Filteau, 2000) as it aids infant health and immunity development.
If mothers are aware of these benefits, they may choose to prolong the duration of breastfeeding
to children who were affected by the flood in order to mitigate the three risks.
A positive response to breastfeeding may be inhibited, however, if mothers are unable to
breastfeed adequately due to the adverse effect of the flood on their own health. Studies show that
adverse health shocks to mothers do not change the quantity or quality of breast milk produced
(Filteau, 2000). In addition, most milk bacteria was non-pathogenic, even amongmothers suffering
from infections in the early post-partum period (Filteau, 2000; Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2009).
This is possibly the result of immunological components present in breast milk. Thus, even mothers
that endure a negative health shock due to the flood are capable of breastfeeding adequately, and
prolonging the practice if they so choose.
I use maximum likelihood estimation to fit a proportional hazard (Cox) model on the survey
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data in order to identify the effect of the flood on the duration of breastfeeding (in months).
The proportional hazard model automatically accounts for the right-censoring in the dependent
variable as approximately 68 percent of the children in my sample are still being breastfed. Thus,
the dummy variable indicating if the child is still being breastfed at the time of the survey indicate
the likelihood of failure in the model. A further advantage of this estimator is that it does not
impose any structure on the baseline hazard function h0(t). However, it is assumed that the
covariates have a proportional effect on the hazard rate.
The hazard rate, hi(t), is the product of a common function of time-at-risk and an exponential
function of observable covariates, as shown below:
hi(t) = h0(t) ∗ exp
(
β1(Cohorti ∗Areai) + β2Cohorti + β3Areai + β4Xi + δi + τi + εi
)
(3.1)
The hazard rate of breastfeeding is the probability of being weaned at t months, conditional
on still being breastfed at t – 1 month. The exponential function consists of a dummy variable
indicating if the child is born in the flood Cohort, a dummy variable indicating if the child lived in
the flooded Areas, the interaction of Cohort and Area and, a vector of observable covariates, Xs. I
use a set of covariates relating to the child, parents and their location9 as my controls and refer to
them as the baseline controls. All estimations account for two-stage cluster sampling through use
of sampling weights. The parameter of interest here is β1, which shows the probability of exiting
from breastfeeding at any given month as a consequence of the flood.
Table 3.3 presents the estimated hazard coefficients (not hazard ratios). The first three columns
highlight the general effect of the flood on the duration of breastfeeding. All estimates in these
columns have the negative sign, indicating that they are ‘survival’ to breastfeeding, rather than
‘exit’ from breastfeeding. Column 1 shows the baseline estimates, where no covariates have been
included, i.e. no Xs. Flood-affected children are 28 percent less likely to be weaned in any given
9 These are the full set of controls for the child’s birth year, linear and quadratic controls for the birth order of the
child, mother’s height (in cm), a dummy variable indicating if the mother has no education, mother’s current age
and age at first birth, a dummy variable indicating if the father had no education, a dummy variable indicating if
the father was involved in agriculture, a dummy variable indicating if the child lives in a rural area, and full set of
controls on the child’s home division.
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month compared to the unaffected (control) children. Inclusion of covariates decreases the hazard
rate of breastfeeding to 58.6 percent.
In column 3, I disaggregate the Area variable into three parts, according to the loss in
production of monsoon rice crop in the district of birth. High indicates a district that experienced
production losses of up to 45 percent andModerate faced losses of up to 30 percent and, the omitted
category includes the remaining districts that faced no production losses. The degree of loss is
indicative of the resource constraints due to the flood. In other words, if breastfeeding provides
a way of coping with the flood-associated resource scarcities, then the difference-in-difference
estimator associated with High should be significant and negative, and potentially stronger than
that ofModerate. On average, flood-affected children from high-intensity and moderate-intensity
areas are 77.9 percent and 53.8 percent less likely to be weaned in any given month respectively
compared to the children in the control group. The coefficients across the high and moderate
intensity areas are statistically distinguishable. This means that with an increase in the loss of crop
production, the probability of being weaned decreased for the affected group increases relative
to the control group. This provides strong evidence that mothers use breastfeeding as a coping
strategy against possible childhood malnutrition caused by the flood.
My research has not found any other study that has studied the impact of early-life shocks
on breastfeeding behaviour, even though it is a critical measure in preventing such shocks from
leading to childhood malnutrition (WHO, 2017). More than 42 percent of the population10
engaged in open-defecation due to lack of sanitation facilities (Mahmud and Mbuya, 2016), an
issue only made worse by the flooding. In fact, incidences of diarrhoea were highest between
July and August 1998 (del Ninno and Lundberg, 2005). Breastfeeding has been found to protect
against diarrhoea and similar gastrointestinal infections (Feachem and Koblinsky, 1984), especially
in populations where such diseases are common (Habicht, DaVanzo, and Butz, 1988). These
benefits were particularly applicable to children below 1 year of age (Feachem and Koblinsky,
10 Open-defecation has been on the decline as part of the government strategy to improve nutrition and hygiene
in the country. Mahmud and Mbuya (2016) show that open-defecation declined from 42 percent in 2003 to 3
percent in 2015. However, prior estimates for 1998 specifically are unavailable, but was potentially even higher.
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1984). However, children between 12-35 months old who were breastfed for longer scored
slightly lower in the weight-for-age measure than completely weaned children in Bangladesh,
but they were also at significantly lower risk of death (Filteau, 2000).
Table 3.3.: Hazard Estimates of the Effect of the Flood on Duration of Breastfeeding
(1) (2) (3)
Cohort*Area –0.280*** –0.586***
(0.105) (0.153)
Cohort*High –0.779***
(0.168)
Cohort*Moderate –0.538***
(0.155)
Cohort 0.748*** –6.142*** –6.136***
(0.096) (0.171) (0.172)
Area 0.157* 0.265**
(0.086) (0.134)
High 0.479***
(0.157)
Moderate 0.226*
(0.136)
Controls No Yes Yes
Observations 5,258 5,258 5,258
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, and are accounting for two-stage cluster
sampling using survey weights. The full set of controls are the child’s birth year, linear and quadratic controls
for the birth order of the child, mother’s height (in cm), a dummy variable indicating if the mother has
no education, mother’s current age and age at first birth, a dummy variable indicating if the father had no
education, a dummy variable indicating if the father was involved in agriculture, a dummy variable indicating
if the child lives in a rural area, and full set of controls on the child’s home division.
GENDER BIAS IN BREASTFEEDING DURATION:
The society in Bangladesh is characterised by patrilineal customs and male-biased laws11,
which indicate a preference for sons among families. In India, it was found that girls are breastfed
less than boys (Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2009). Mothers exhibiting a preference for sons,
may be keen to conceive again in the hope for a son when they give birth to a daughter. As
breastfeeding is a natural contraceptive, they wean their daughters early to get ready for a future
11 For example, sons typically receive twice the inheritance as that of daughters, due to Islamic inheritance laws.
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pregnancy sooner. As Bangladesh shares similar social features to that of India, similar practices
may hold.
Does a similar rationale play out during a crisis? The flood constrained resources and increased
morbidity and mortality rates. Under such circumstances, mothers may concentrate their efforts
on the survival of existing children, instead of diverting resources for expected children. However,
son-preference may still be prevalent as sons have higher potential incomes, and mothers may
choose to spend the available time investing in their sons by breastfeeding them longer. Thus, it is
not apparent if gender-bias will be prevalent in breastfeeding in the aftermath of the flood.
I estimate the effect of the flood on breastfeeding using maximum likelihood estimation to fit
a proportional hazard model. Once again, the hazard rate of breastfeeding is the probability of
being weaned at t months, conditional on still being breastfed at t – 1 month. In the following
equation, I include a dummy variable, Fi, that takes the value one if child i is a girl, and zero
otherwise. As before, Xi contains the full set of controls, including the interactions between the
three key variables - Cohorti, Areai and Fi. The coefficient of interest here is β1, which shows if
there is a differential impact of the flood on girls relative to those who are unaffected.
hi(t) = h0(t) ∗ exp
(
β1(Cohorti ∗Areai ∗ Fi) + β2Cohorti + β3Areai + β4Fi + β5Xi + δi + τi + εi
)
(3.2)
The estimator highlights the change in duration of breastfeeding for girls in the treatment cohort
relative to girls in the control cohort in affected areas, net of the change in months breastfed for
girls relative to boys. If girls fair poorer, then the hazard estimates will be positive, i.e. girls will
be more likely to be weaned in a given month compared to boys.
Table 3.4 presents the results of this estimator to show the (lack of ) gender-bias in the duration
of breastfeeding as a result of the flood. Column 1 estimates the impact for all children and column
2 for the subset of children with no elder brothers. The estimator of interest are very similar
to the results obtained in Table 3.3 - flood-affected children were 66 percent less likely to be
weaned in any given month compared to unaffected children (column 1). However, when this
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estimator is interacted with the dummy for Female, there is no effect. This indicates that there is
no gender-bias in the effect of the flood on duration of breastfeeding.
Perhaps a preference for sons is not demonstrated among average families during a crisis.
However, boys affected by the flood who have no elder brothers may be especially well taken care
off. Or, a crisis may accentuate the need for a son among families with no prior sons, leading to
early weaning of daughters. To investigate if such behaviour holds, I re-estimate the above hazard
function for children who have no elder brothers. Columns 2 of Table 3.4 shows the results for
this analysis. Once again, there is no evidence of gender-bias in breastfeeding duration across
either specifications.
3.4.2. Anthropometric Measures
Several studies (Skoufias, Vinha, and Conroy, 2011; Rodriguez-Llanes et al., 2011; Caruso, 2015;
Aguilar and Vicarelli, 2011) in the field have noted the negative effect of a natural disaster and the
consequent malnutrition on anthropometric measures of children. These studies have typically
analysed the effect of the natural disaster on the height-for-age z-score, a standardised measure that
can be compared across sexes and ages. The z-score is calculated by taking the difference between
the child’s height and the median height of the reference population and then normalizing it with
the standard deviation of the height of the reference population for the same age-sex. The DHS
database uses as reference population the NCHS/WHO international reference population. A
z-score of zero indicates the median age-sex specific height; while a negative score shows shorter
stature and a positive one shows taller stature. If the height-for-age z-score is below –2 for children
under the age of three, they are considered ‘stunted’.
Caruso (2015) highlights the persistence of the negative impact of the flood in Tanzania
on height-for-age z-score among girls. They state that children affected by the flood were
0.44 standard deviations shorter than those unaffected, with a more pronounced effect on girls.
Skoufias, Vinha, and Conroy (2011) find that precipitation has a marked negative impact of about
0.50 standard deviations on height-for-age z-score for children in rural Mexico, even more so
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Table 3.4.: Hazard Estimates of the Gender-Bias on Duration of Breast-
feeding
All Children No Elder Brothers
(1) (2)
Cohort*Area –0.661*** –0.599***
(0.175) (0.231)
Cohort*Area*Female 0.127 –0.160
(0.181) (0.276)
Area*Female –0.223* 0.061
(0.127) (0.197)
Cohort*Female –0.161 0.110
(0.161) (0.250)
Cohort –6.057*** –5.886***
(0.185) (0.253)
Area 0.378*** 0.240
(0.143) (0.198)
Female 0.293*** 0.015
(0.113) (0.178)
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 5,258 2,527
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, and are account-
ing for two-stage cluster sampling using survey weights. The full set of controls
are the child’s birth year, linear and quadratic controls for the birth order of
the child, mother’s height (in cm), a dummy variable indicating if the mother
has no education, mother’s current age and age at first birth, a dummy variable
indicating if the father had no education, a dummy variable indicating if the
father was involved in agriculture, a dummy variable indicating if the child
lives in a rural area, and full set of controls on the child’s home division. About
49 percent of the sample had no elder brothers, accounting for the reduced
sample size.
than a change in temperature. In addition, they note that boys are more likely to suffer from
growth faltering regardless of the shock (precipitation or temperature), mainly due to the increased
morbidity rates among boys. Rodriguez-Llanes et al. (2011) report that exposure to floods in rural
Orissa, India, is associated with childhood malnutrition. They showed that flooded households
had higher prevalence of stunted and underweight children compared to unaffected households.
Aguilar and Vicarelli (2011) use absolute height and weight (instead of the standardised z-scores),
and as others, notes a negative effect on both these measures for children in Mexico exposed to
ENSO-related floods in the first two years of their life. In terms of magnitude, they find children
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were shorter by 0.4-0.7 inches, and lighter by 0.84 pounds. Most importantly, Alderman (2010)
notes that weather shocks that lead to nutritional deprivation in the first year of life has a lasting
impact on productivity, even if the households are able to overcome poverty subsequently.
Low height-for-age z-scores and in particular, stunting, indicates failure to reach the linear
growth potential. If stunting sets in the first 1000 days (2.7 years approximately) of a child’s
life, it is generally irreversible. For example, Caruso (2015) found Tanzanian girls affected by
the flood in childhood were shorter than those unaffected even 17 years later. Stunting has
been associated with poor cognitive and physical development, diminished productive capacity,
increased risk of degenerative diseases, etc. (WHO, 2014). Childhood malnutrition, including
intrauterine malnutrition due to poor health and diet of the mother, accounts for 20 percent of
childhood stunting cases. Poor feeding practices, such as sub-optimal breastfeeding, exposure
to contaminated environments, household poverty, and food insecurity, all interact to impede
growth and development (WHO, 2014).
While low height-for-age z-score and its extreme measure, stunting, reflect a long-term
decline; low weight-for-height z-score, and wasting, indicates recent and severe process of weight
loss. However, it may also reflect the vicious cycle between infection and wasting. Wasting and
stunting share underlying causal factors, and it is believed that wasting contributes to stunting
(WHO (2014)). However, while stunting has been associated with a general decline in quality
of life through reduced social and economic potential, wasting is mainly related to increased
morbidity. Similar to the definition of being ‘stunting’, a child is considered ‘wasted’ if the
weight-for-age z-score is below –2.
The 1998 flood impacted all the primary causes of childhood stunting and wasting. Around
20 percent of the districts experienced production losses of more than 45 percent for the primary
monsoon crop. As a consequence, not only did food supplies decline, agricultural labour also
suffered a large negative income shock. Moreover, the flood damaged homes, drinking water and
sewage systems and increased exposure to contaminated environments. These factors may lead
to poorer height-for-age and weight-for-height z-scores. For my study, the weight-for-height
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z-scores may not be very reliable. Children exposed to the flood were surveyed more than a year
after the event, and thus results on weight-for-height may reflect more recent changes rather
than the flood itself.
To determine the effect of the flood on anthropometric measures, I estimate the following
equation:
Yi = β1(Cohorti ∗Areai) + β2Cohorti + β3Areai + β4Xi + δi + τi + εi (3.3)
where Yi refers to height-for-age z-score or weight-for-age z-score of child i. The remaining
variables are defined as before: Cohort is a dummy variable indicating if the child is born in
the flood-affected cohort, Area is a dummy variable indicating if the child was born in a flood-
affected district and X includes baseline covariates. The estimations account for two-stage stratified
sampling via use of sample weights. The parameter of interest is β1, a DD estimator that highlights
the change in the outcomes due to the flood.
In Table 3.5, I present the OLS estimates of the effect of the flood on stunting in columns 1
and 2, and on wasting in columns 3 and 4. Firstly, the unconditional mean of the height-for-age
z-score is –1.81, implying that on average, children in Bangladesh are 1.81 standard deviations
shorter than the reference population. This is expected as children in South Asia display very high
rates of short stature and stunting. The first two columns show that the flood has not affected the
height-for-age z-score, whether we consider the area as a whole or disaggregated by damage
intensity. Height-for-age z-scores are less susceptible to immediate scarcities, but capture chronic
conditions (Skoufias, Vinha, and Conroy, 2011). The fact that the flood had no effect on the
height-for-age z-score is reassuring in terms of the flood not having a long-term impact.
The unconditional mean for weight-for-age z-score is –1.17, once again highlighting that
children in Bangladesh are 1.17 standard deviations lighter than the reference population. Columns
3 and 4 do show an impact of the flood. Children affected by the flood were 7.5 percent more
likely to show signs of wasting compared to children unaffected by the flood. The incidence of
wasting was more likely to take place among children from districts that suffered up to 45 percent
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Table 3.5.: OLS Estimates on Stunting & Wasting
Stunting Wasting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cohort*Area 0.015 0.075*
(0.045) (0.042)
Cohort*High –0.008 0.101**
(0.056) (0.047)
Cohort*Moderate 0.023 0.066
(0.045) (0.042)
High –0.017 –0.090**
(0.045) (0.043)
Moderate –0.013 –0.075*
(0.038) (0.040)
Cohort 0.171*** 0.172*** –0.296*** –0.297***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.048) (0.048)
Area –0.012 –0.079**
(0.037) (0.040)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,258 5,258 5,258 5,258
R-squared 0.117 0.117 0.049 0.049
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, and are accounting for two-stage cluster sampling using
survey weights. The full set of controls are the child’s birth year, linear and quadratic controls for the birth order of the
child, mother’s height (in cm), a dummy variable indicating if the mother has no education, mother’s current age and age
at first birth, a dummy variable indicating if the father had no education, a dummy variable indicating if the father was
involved in agriculture, a dummy variable indicating if the child lives in a rural area, and full set of controls on the child’s
home division.
production loss of the monsoon rice crop. These results have to be approached with caution as
the weight data was collected at least two years after flood and weight is subject to fluctuations
due to immediate illnesses. It is not clear, however, why children who were affected by the flood
would show lower weight-for-age z-scores relative to those unaffected, especially given that their
height-for-age z-scores are unaffected.
To further investigate the effect of the flood on weight-for-age z-scores, I present quantile
estimates in Table 3.6. In the 10th, 25th, 50th and 75th quantiles, children affected by the flood
report lower weight-for-age z-scores compared to those unaffected. As a final check, I also
investigate if there was any gender-bias in the effect of the flood on anthropometric measures.
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Table 3.6.: Quantile Regression Estimates of the Effect of the Flood on Weight-for-Age z-score
Quantile Regression Estimates
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Cohort*Area –0.272** –0.216** –0.159** –0.248* –0.077
(0.113) (0.086) (0.080) (0.149) (0.369)
Area 0.151 0.248*** 0.202** 0.235* 0.058
(0.115) (0.067) (0.089) (0.125) (0.329)
Cohort 0.366*** 0.347*** 0.275*** 0.278* 0.175
(0.117) (0.108) (0.099) (0.157) (0.362)
Observations 5,258 5,258 5,258 5,258 5,258
R-squared 0.056 0.055 0.056 0.058 0.050
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Quantile regressions use no survey weights, and errors are
clustered at district-of-birth. Controls are: linear and quadratic birth order, mother’s height, dummy for rural residence,
and fixed effects on year-of-birth, district-of-birth and survey year.
Similar to the results on duration of breastfeeding, I find no gender-bias on the effect on either
anthropometric measures. The results are presented in Appendix, Table C.1.
There are several reasons for the discrepancy between my results and that of the existing
literature. The 1998 was shorter in duration compared to the famine in Bangladesh (Hernández-
Julián, Mansour, and Peters, 2014). More importantly, the country experienced bumper production
in paddy immediately following the flood, partly due to the sediment deposits from the flood
(Khandker, 2007). Further, the last major flood had occurred only a decade prior, and had been
a valuable lesson. The government set up massive disaster-management facilities specifically
from the learnings of the 1988 flood. In addition, there was rapid deployment of the Vulnerable
Group Feeding program and expansions of existing safety net programs, such as Food-for-Work,
Test Relief, etc., including increased availability of loans. These programs reinforced the coping
mechanism among households and prevented the 1998 flood from having long-term consequences
of children, as measured by the height-for-age z-score.
In the Appendix, I also show two additional measures that are unaffected by the flood:
subjective size at birth and terminated pregnancies. These two measures use slightly different
samples, due to the availability of these variables in the surveys. However, both measures show no
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significant difference between children affected and unaffected by the flood.
3.5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I study the impact of early-life shocks on a specific behavioural response, duration
of breastfeeding by mothers, and on anthropometric outcomes of children in Bangladesh. I use
the 1998 flood as a natural experiment to implement a difference-in-difference framework with
data from two waves of the DHS. I show that children affected by the flood were less likely to be
weaned in a given month compared to unaffected children, regardless of their gender. No other
study has highlighted the relation between such early-life shocks and breastfeeding behaviour
to my knowledge. Breastfeeding is particularly effective in preventing infectious diseases in
environments with contaminated food and water sources. I also show that the 1998 flood had no
effect on incidences of stunting, although it did increase the probability of wasting. Stunting is a
sign of chronic conditions, while wasting is symptomatic of immediate illnesses. In other words,
it is easier to recover from lower weight than stunted growth. Further, I find that there was no
significant difference on the effect of the flood on children who were at the top end of the weight
distribution, i.e. the 90th quantile. Once again, there was no gender-disparity in anthropometric
outcomes. The 1998 flood was one of the worst floods experienced in Bangladesh. The fact that
the impact on children are so muted shows that there are measures that can be taken to protect
children against such climate related disasters.
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APPENDIX A
FALLING ABSOLUTE EARNINGS MOBILITY IN THE UK
A.1. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
A.1.1. Women at age 30 and 40
In Figure 1.4, I show that the gap in absolute earnings mobility persists in recent years, even
though women’s earnings have enjoyed a larger growth than men’s. One possible reason behind
this gap could be that age 30 is traditionally a child-bearing age. This means that some women
are out of the labour force, who may have commanded higher earnings, other women may be
working part-time and therefore receiving lower wages compared to their usual earnings, and
so on. However, I argue that the gap in absolute mobility persists in spite of the composition of
women by comparing absolute earnings mobility between men and women at age 40. Figure
A.1 presents the results. At age 40, the gap between men and women are much larger even for
recent cohorts. Clearly the factors driving the gap in absolute mobility are more structural than
compositional.
A.1.2. Life-cycle Bias
The baseline results compare children’s and fathers’ earnings at age 30 to estimate absolute mobility.
However, this estimate maybe biased if children and fathers are not at the same point in their
career at age of 30. It would instead be preferable to compare children and fathers when they are
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Figure A.1.: Absolute mobility across women and men at age 40
Source: FES (1968 - 2017), QLFS (1993-2018)
All measures are deflated using the CPI. Children and fathers report earnings at
age 40.
at the same stage of their careers, as measured by their labour market experience for example. The
age at which fathers completed full time education was, on average, 16 years. Thus, at age 30,
they have spent 14 years approximately in the labour market. The age at which children complete
their full-time education has increased to 17 for cohorts born before 1973 and 18 thereafter. Thus,
if labour market experience is kept fixed, 30 year old fathers should be compared to 31 year old
children if born on or before 1973, and 32 year old children if born after 1973. I re-estimate
absolute mobility using the baseline fathers’ marginal earnings distributions, baseline transition
matrix, and this new group of children’s marginal earnings distribution. Figure A.2 plots the
results. There is almost no difference in our estimates regardless of these small changes in the age
group of children.
A.1.3. Maximum and Minimum Copula Bounds
As an additional check on if my results are driven by the choice of the transition matrix, I also
perform the bounds analysis developed by Chetty, Grusky, et al., 2017. The bounds analysis
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Figure A.2.: Absolute mobility across women and men at age 40
Source: FES (1968 - 2017), QLFS (1993-2018)
All measures are deflated using the CPI. Fathers report earnings at age 40. Children
report earnings at age 31 until 2013 and at age 32 afterwards.
produces transition matrices that maximise or minimize absolute mobility in a given year, subject
to two conditions: (1) Each matrix is bi-stochastic, and (2) the earnings distribution of children
with higher-earnings parents first-order stochastically dominates the earnings distribution of
children from lower-earnings families. Therefore, I have two transition matrices for each, one that
maximises absolute mobility and the other minimises it. I re-estimate absolute earnings mobility
using these transition matrices and show the results in Figure A.3, along with the baseline.
To estimate absolute mobility, we use the same marginal earnings distributions as our baseline
and the cohort-specific transition matrices produced by this exercise. Figure A.3 illustrates the
three series: Baseline, transition matrices that maximize absolute mobility (Max TM), and transition
matrices that minimize absolute mobility (Min TM).
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Figure A.3.: Absolute mobility, bounds analysis
Source: FES (1968 - 2017), QLFS (1993-2018), BCS (1970)
All measures are deflated using the CPI. Children and fathers are aged 30.
A.2. COUNTERFACTUAL INEQUALITY
The level of inequality among children was much higher than among the fathers, although
there has been little change in inequality in recent years. Nonetheless, I check the impact of a
small change in inequality on absolute earnings mobility. I use the baseline marginal earnings
distribution for fathers and the baseline transition matrix. Unlike the growth in earnings, there is
no objective choice on the level of inequality. Therefore, I use the lowest and highest observed
levels of inequality among children as the benchmark with which to create the counterfactual. In
2017, inequality was the lowest, and in 1993 it was the highest. I calculate the share of earnings
at each decile in 2017, and impose these shares in all other years, without changing the total
income across all deciles. Thus, I have a counterfactual marginal earnings distribution for children
which exhibits lower level of inequality for all years, excepting 2017 when it is equal, or higher
levels of inequality for all years excepting 1993 when it is equal. Using these three components,
I re-estimate absolute earnings mobility. The results are shown in Figure A.4. Counterfactual
earnings among children with higher or lower levels of inequality make very little difference to
99
APPENDIX A. FALLING ABSOLUTE EARNINGS MOBILITY IN THE UK
the absolute mobility estimates. It certainly does not explain the fall in absolute mobility over the
last decade.
Figure A.4.: Absolute mobility under counterfactual earnings inequality
among children
Source: FES (1968 - 2017), QLFS (1993-2018), BCS (1970)
All measures are deflated using the CPI. Children and fathers are aged 30.
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ABSOLUTE MOBILITY IN HOUSEHOLDS
B.1. COMPARISON WITH BERMAN (2018)
Berman (2018) present a cross-country analysis of absolute income mobility, simplifying the
methodology in Chetty, Grusky, et al. (2017) further by introducing two changes. First, he uses
the method of generalized Pareto curve interpolation (Blanchet, Piketty, and Fournier, 2017)
to derive the marginal income distributions using two points - the mean and some measure of
inequality, which in their case is the top 10 percent share of incomes. In addition, he assumes
that the joint parent-child incomes follow the bivariate log-normal distribution1. Second, he
shows that the rank correlation is a sufficient statistic to capture the details in relative mobility.
Both these changes make it even easier to compute absolute mobility, and he demonstrates this by
estimating it for several countries, including the UK. However, these results do not conform with
my findings.
The reason for this discrepancy is, as I will show, down to the use of a more aggregate
dataset that did not fully capture the changes to household level income and inequalities that
survey data better represents. The marginal income distributions are constructed using pre-tax
national income for adults from the World Inequality Database (WID). As the WID does not
1 Chetty, Grusky, et al. (2017) argue that incomes cannot be well-approximated by such a distribution, but he
shows that this assumption leads to a maximum of 10 percentage point difference between his estimates and that of
Chetty, Grusky, et al. (2017)’s.
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report estimates at the micro-level, there is no cohort-level information. As a result, these marginal
income distributions can only be attributed to specific years, and he chooses to compare these
distributions across every 30 years. In contrast, I rely on survey data focusing on specific cohorts
of interest. I can observe individual and household incomes within a narrow age-band of interest,
in my case age 30. And, because I can observe relationships within each cross-section, I can match
parents and children using the birth cohort of the child. This accounts for the changing age of
fertility across the years. Most importantly, the surveys that inform my analysis are the same ones
used by the UK government to understand the changes in household income and inequalities.
In Figure B.1 I present the absolute mobility estimates reported in Berman (2018)2 in green,
along with my baseline estimates in red and estimates using my baseline sample and their method
in blue. Our results diverge both in terms of the trend and the level. They find that absolute
income mobility in the UK declined consistently between 1994 and 2009. On the other hand,
I find that absolute income mobility among 30-year-olds in the UK grew between 1994 and
2005, after which it began to fall. Compared to their estimates, my baseline results are about 10
percentage points higher in 2004 and 3 percentage points higher in 2014.
First, I show that given the survey data I use, both methods generate approximately the
same level of absolute income mobility. Specifically, I calculate average real weekly income and
the Gini coefficient of income for each year in my sample, and then interpolate to generate the
full distribution. Following Berman (2018), I assume that the rank correlation for the UK is 0.3.
Together, these two pieces of information provides the estimates of absolute income mobility
shown in blue. I do not report the confidence intervals for my baseline here, but given that the
maximum gap between the blue and red lines are four percentage points, they are not significantly
different from each other. In other words, the methodology produced by Berman (2018) matches
up well with the established methodology of Chetty, Grusky, et al. (2017). This implies that the
differences in our estimates is due to the data used.
2 Berman (2018) present the results from 1989-2014. As I do not have estimates between 1989-1993, I only report
their findings from 1994.
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Figure B.1.: Absolute mobility, baseline vs other studies
Source: FES (1968-2000), FRS (1994-2017), Berman (2018)
Berman (2018) uses the estimates for the UK from their paper. Baseline result
replicates the estimates presented in 2.3. Baseline sample uses the same sample, but
estimates mobility using Berman (2018)’s method. Adults, Equal-Split does the
same, but for a sample of adults whose incomes are equivalized by the number of
partners.
Second, I show why using survey data is more appropriate in this regard. Absolute income
mobility is affected by three factors - relative mobility (which both Berman (2018) and I find
to be of little importance under current economic conditions), income inequality and income
growth. To understand how using aggregate national statistics that do not refer to specific age
groups can skew the results, I compare the level of inequality between three sources: the top
10 percent income share from the WID, the Gini coefficient in my sample of 30-year-olds, and
the Gini coefficient for Great Britain published by the Cribb, Norris Keiller, and Waters (2018),
which I use as a benchmark. Strictly speaking, the top 10 percent income share and the Gini
coefficient are not directly comparable but they are both measures of inequality and used for the
same end in the method proposed by Berman (2018). The Gini coefficients for 30-year-olds and
the benchmark are similar for the most part. The difference between the two remain within
0.02 points of each other for 22 of the 47 years reported here. In addition, the major difference
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is experienced in the 1980s for the parent sample: 30-year-olds experienced a faster growth in
inequality in the 1980s compared to GB as a whole. On the other hand, the top 10 percent income
share is consistently higher than the benchmark. The two measures lie within 0.02 points of each
other for only two of the 50 years studied. In other words, using the top 10 percent income share
from the national income records assumes higher level of inequality in the UK than is actually
experienced. Differences in the level of inequality change the level of absolute mobility observed
in a given year, and explains why Berman (2018) finds much lower levels compared to my results.
Figure B.2.: Inequality measures
Source: FES (1968-2000), FRS (1994-2017), Berman (2018), IFS (2018)
Gini, 30-year-olds, show the baseline estimates of Gini computed on gross household
income, where at least one adult member is 30 years old. Gini, GB shows the Gini
coefficient for equivalized household net income in Great Britain reported by Cribb,
Norris Keiller, and Waters (2018). Top 10% share is estimated on pre-tax national
for adults reported by Berman (2018)
.
The final issue is to compare the growth in income across the sample. I use the average
income reported for parents and children in Berman (2018) to construct a series from 1977-2014.
I do this to compare their results with the reported growth in mean real equivalized household
disposable income of individuals by the Office of National Statistics (Webber and O’Neill, 2019),
which I consider as the benchmark. As a comparison, I also plot the growth rate in unequivalized
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household income from my baseline sample for the same period. These comparisons are illustrated
in Figure B.3. Once again, I find that the growth rate in incomes (although using different
definitions) are very similar in trend between the benchmark and my baseline sample. The main
difference is that the sample of 30-year-olds experience slightly lower levels of growth over time.
For example, in 2018, the benchmark of all adults had 2.18 times the annual income in 1977,
whereas my baseline sample had only 2.02 times that. On the other hand, the growth rate reported
in Berman (2018) sharply undermines the actual experience and this difference increases with
time. The implications of this are that the children in their sample experienced much less growth
in the mid-1990s than the benchmark, but they also suffered from a lower decline after the Great
Recession. As a result, not only is absolute income mobility lower in levels, the trend is also
different. Without the sharp rise in incomes in the 1990s, Berman (2018) does not find increasing
absolute mobility during that era, and instead finds that absolute mobility consistently declined.
Figure B.3.: Growth in incomes
Source: FES (1968-2000), FRS (1994-2017), ONS (2018)
Berman (2018 uses the pre-tax national income for all adults, equivalized using an
equal-split. I consider the unequivalized pre-tax income for 30-year-olds.
This exercise illuminates the importance of using relevant data in answering any research
question. The simplified methodology presented by Berman (2018) indeed makes it easier to
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calculate absolute mobility, and also significantly reduces the data requirement. However, it is
imperative that we use data that is applicable to the demographic we are studying.
B.2. ROBUSTNESS CHECK
B.2.1. Life-cycle Bias
In my baseline analysis, I consider children and parents who are aged 30 on average, assuming
that both groups are at a similar point in their life-cycle. If they are not, and children take longer
to reach the same stage as the parents, then the downward trend in absolute mobility could be due
to life-cycle bias (Haider and Solon, 2006). I address this concern in Figure B.4, by re-estimating
absolute income mobility for children and parents aged 40. Unfortunately, as consumption data is
available for a shorter duration, I am unable to produce a corresponding series for consumption.
Absolute income mobility exhibits a clear downward trend over the last decade, regardless of the
chosen age. However, the levels are slightly lower for age 40 than for the baseline.
B.2.2. Equivalisation
To understand how the change in family structures may affect absolute mobility, I equivalize
outcomes using two scales: (1) the OECD-modified scale3, and (2) square root of family size. The
results are shown in Figure B.5. Equivalisation does not change the trend in absolute mobility
but shifts it upwards. This is to be expected as family sizes are now smaller among the children’s
generation compared to the parent’s generation. For example, the average number of children per
household is slightly larger than two in the parent’s generation and less than two in the children’s.
I prefer the specification without equivalization as it encompasses these changes.
3 OECD scale places a weight of 1 for the first adult, 0.5 for all subsequent members aged above 13, and 0.3 for all
members aged 13 or below
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Figure B.4.: Absolute mobility in incomes at ages 30 and 40
Source: FES (1968 - 2000), FRS (1994 - 2017), QLFS (1993-2018)
All measures are deflated using the CPI. No equivalization has been used.
Figure B.5.: Absolute mobility in incomes, equivalization
Source: FES (1968 - 2000), FRS (1994 - 2017), QLFS (1993-2018)
All measures are deflated using the CPI. Incomes are equivalized using the number
of partners.
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B.2.3. Sampling Error
My baseline estimates do not account for sampling errors, and therefore it is not clear if there is a
significant difference in the level of absolute mobility across time or across dimensions. I use the
empirical bootstrap to provide 95 percent confidence intervals for each of my estimations. These
confidence intervals provide the basis for inference in the level and trend differences across time
and across outcomes.
Figure B.6 provides the baseline absolute mobility estimates for income and consumption4,
with grey bands depicting the confidence intervals around each outcome. These intervals were
quite tight around absolute income mobility. For example, the mean estimate of absolute income
mobility in 2018 was 61.12 percent and the confidence interval is [59.48, 62.62]. In addition, there
is a significant different in the level of absolute mobility between 2007 and 2017. The confidence
intervals around consumption mobility are wider: In 2018, these intervals are [44.55, 49.40] for a
mean estimate of 47.05. There is no significant difference between absolute consumption in 2007
and 2018, indicating stable trends.
B.2.4. Alternate Price Deflator
The CPI used to adjust for prices assume that all households, across the distribution, faced the
same set of prices and purchased the same bundle of goods. However, preferences vary across
the income distribution. For example, luxuries are more prevalent among well-off households
while necessities dominate the basket of goods at the bottom of the income distribution. I account
for these issues by re-estimating absolute mobility of all three outcomes, but adjusting for the
prices using the re-weighted CPI (RCPI). Details on the construction of the RCPI are provided
in the Appendix B.5. As I have consumption data covering the period between 1988-2017, I
could construct the RCPI for that period only. Consequently, Table B.1 presents the difference in
absolute mobility when using the RCPI and the CPI for an abbreviated period.
4 Bootstrap confidence intervals for earnings is presented in Chapter 1.
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Figure B.6.: Absolute mobility in income and consumption, bootstrap con-
fidence intervals
Source: FES (1968 - 2000), FRS (1994 - 2017)
The confidence band shows the maximum and minimum absolute mobility estimate
from bootstrap resamples. All measures are deflated using the CPI. No equivalization
has been used.
Accounting for the differences in consumption at each income decile results in a higher level
of absolute mobility across all outcomes and all years, although these differences reduce over time
(excepting consumption). For example, absolute income mobility is 75 percent in 2009 using
RCPI compared to 65 percent in the baseline and 64 percent in 2017 instead of 61 percent in
the baseline. Between 2009-2017, absolute income mobility declined by 11 percentage points,
compared to my baseline estimate of four percentage points only. The change in absolute mobility
in consumption has been a lot lower in comparison to the other two outcomes. Correcting for the
consumption bundle increases consumption mobility by a maximum of three percentage points.
However, this does not change the fact that absolute income mobility was much higher in levels
than absolute consumption mobility.
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Table B.1.: Absolute mobility, corrected for differences in consumption bundles across in-
come deciles
Year Difference in Absolute Mobility, RCPI and CPI
Consumption Income
2009 2.25 9.79
2010 2.33 9.72
2011 2.32 8.75
2012 2.51 7.79
2013 2.65 6.65
2014 2.88 6.50
2015 3.02 5.76
2016 2.91 4.87
2017 2.96 3.02
Source: FES (1968-2017), FRS (1994-2017)
The difference is taken by deducting absolute mobility estimates using CPI from that using RCPI.
B.3. EARNINGS
In Chapter 1, the children’s sample is drawn from the QLFS; in this chapter, it is taken from
the FRS. The choice of survey is motivated by the fact that the QLFS provides reliable earnings
information, and the FRS provides income information at the household level. Figure B.7 shows
that regardless of the survey used, both the FRS and LFS generate similar trend in real weekly
mean earnings. As the trends overlap, this means that my results do not depend on the specific
survey used.
B.4. EXPERIENCE AMONG WOMEN
In figure 2.6 I showed that women’s absolute income mobility experience was worse than men’s
across the whole period. A possible counterargument is that women may be engaged in familial
responsibilities at age 30 and therefore, their incomes may not be representative of their eventual
permanent income. In the following figure, I show the level of absolute income mobility at age 30
for all women (the baseline), at age 30 for women without children and at age 40 for all women.
Figure B.8 shows the baseline level of absolute income mobility in red, which also happens
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Figure B.7.: Earnings growth in the FRS and the QLFS
Source: FRS(1994 - 2017), QLFS (1993-2018).
Growth rates in real weekly mean individual earnings. Sample includes 30-year-old
individuals. Prices adjusted using the CPI.
to be the best case of absolute income mobility. Here, best refers to the highest level of absolute
income mobility. Next, I show absolute income mobility for those women who had no children
at age 30 (in yellow). The reasoning here is that if women do not have children at age 30, they
did not take maternity leaves or engage in part-time work for child-rearing and therefore, may
be more comparable with men at similar age. It turns out that these women have an even worse
experience of absolute mobility. The shape of the trend is similar, but it is lower than the baseline
at all levels. The comparison group in both cases are fathers at age 30. In green, I show the
absolute income mobility among women at age 40. Absolute income mobility among women at
age 40 was worse than at age 30 until just after the Great Recession. After this event, both trends
converge. Even at age 40, the growth in women’s earnings have not caught up with men from
their father’s generation.
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Figure B.8.: Absolute mobility in individual incomes among women
Source: FES (1968 - 2000), FRS (1994 - 2017), QLFS (1993-2018)
All comparisons are at the individual level between fathers and "daughters". All
measures are deflated using the CPI. No equivalization has been used.
B.5. THE RE-WEIGHTED CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
All goods have a price, and this price varies over time. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is
"measuring the average price change on the basis of the changed expenditure of maintaining the
consumption pattern of households and the composition of the consumer population in the base
or reference period" (ONS, 2010). It must be noted that the CPI is an average measure, and relies
on the average expenditure on the items of a typical shopping basket. Using the CPI to adjust
for inflation assumes that all households consume the typical basket, and that they face the same
prices5. However, these assumptions are frequently violated.
Preferences for goods and services vary systematically across many attributes, such as the
household’s location in income distribution, their demographic composition, etc. In addition,
some goods may only be available to certain households due to their location in the income
5 Prices may differ for even relatively homogeneous products across stores, and even across time within space
Attanasio and Pistaferri, 2016. As I do not have the means to make this price comparison, I do not discuss this issue
further in this section.
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distribution, or geographical position. For example, luxuries are more prevalent in the basket
of households with high incomes, whereas necessities feature more among households with low
incomes. Expenditures on healthcare may bear a greater weight in the basket of goods for the
the elderly, while spending on education may form a greater share among households with
children and adolescents. This means that using the same bundle over-estimates spending for
some households and under-estimates it for others.
Currently, the CPI assigns an average weight for different items in a basket of goods. More
precisely, household expenditures are recorded using a hierarchical system where each individual
item, such as apples, detergents, garden furnitures, phones etc, are categorised into 12 groups6. A
household’s total expenditure is the sum of spending on each of these groups. This total expenditure
is normalized to 1000, and the spending in each individual group is represented by an integer
weight in parts per 1000. To create the average basket, we take the average weight for each group
across all households.
To address the heterogeneity in preferences across the income distribution, I assign differential
weights to the consumption bundle based on the household’s location in the income distribution.
For a given year, I assign decile ranks for each household based on their gross income. I then
calculate the average weight for these 12 groups for each decile across all years. As I am re-
weighting the consumption bundle, I refer to this price index as the Re-weighted CPI (RCPI).
The RCPI is calculated in two steps as shown below. First, I estimate the aggregate index for each
income decile in a given year:
RIt,d =
w1t,d ×
I1t
I1t–1
+w2t,d ×
I2t
I2t–1
+ ... +w12t,d ×
I12t
I12t–1
w1t,d +w
2
t,d + ... +w
12
t,d
× 100
Here, RIt,d refers to the unlinked re-weighted index and w
g
t,d to the weight of expenditure in g
6 The groups are: (1) Food and non-alcoholic beverages, (2) Alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics, (3) Clothing
and footwear, (4) Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels, (5) Furnishings, household equipment and
routine household maintenance, (6) Health, (7) Transport, (8) Information and communication, (9) Recreation,
sport and culture, (10) Education services, (11) Restaurants and accommodation services and, (12) Miscellaneous
goods and services.
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for income decile d in year t. Igt and I
g
t–1 are the price indices for g in year t and t – 1 respectively.
For each t, t – 1 serves as the base year with a value of 100. Notice that the price indices Igt do
not refer to specific income deciles, as this information is unavailable. In other words, the RCPI
only accounts for heterogeneity in the shopping basket consumed, not the prices faced, across the
income distribution. The final step is to link the RIt,d across all years and convert it to the standard
reference base. I use 2016 as my reference base following the current CPI series used elsewhere in
this study. I calculate the RCPI for the period 1988-2017 as follows:
RCPIbase=2016,d =
RI2017,d × RI2016,d × ...× RI1989,d
1002017–1988
× 100
RI2016,d
RCPI is the re-weighted CPI with 2016 as the base year.
CPI & RCPI: Figure B.9 plots the time series of the CPI and the (average) RCPI. Both series
have the same base year as apparent from the convergence in 2016. Both series use the same price
indices, but a different weighting of the basket of goods consumed. Therefore, the trends are
similar across the years for both series. However, the RCPI is about 0.04 points higher than the
CPI until 1995, gradually reducing over the years until convergence in the base year. This means
that incomes prior to 1995 will be valued less using the RCPI compared to the CPI, while incomes
from 2016 will be valued the same. In other words, parent’s income distributions will be adjusted
downwards, while children’s will be roughly the same or slightly lower.
The reason for the divergence mainly comes down to differences in data. First, the CPI
series uses primarily the FES, but supplements it with additional data sources for housing and food
related expenditures - both of which are major expenditure categories. I do not have access to
this data, and therefore rely only on the FES. Second, the price aggregates available from the
ONS follow the COICOP classification from 1988, whereas the FES began to report expenditures
following COICOP after 2000. As seen in the Figure B.9, CPI and RCPI are much closer after
2001, differing by about 0.01 points only after 2005. Between 1994-2000, expenditures were
reported according to the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). The problem with a
change in classification is how to map detailed expenditure categories, known as items, from HICP
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Figure B.9.: The evolution of the CPI and the RCPI
Source: FES (1988 - 2017), ONS Price Indices (1988-2018)
CPI refers the official release, and RCPI to the re-weighted CPI. Sample includes
all households with positive income.
to COICOP and vice versa. In particular, HICP items do not have a one-to-one mapping with the
COICOP items. For example, the item domestic help under HICP is related to two groups under
the COICOP, housing and furnishings. In addition, some HICP items are only partly related
to COICOP items. In such cases, I have used my judgment on which group best represents the
item. Further, prior to 1994, the expenditure categories were even more aggregated, and several
items that are now included (or have been retrospectively included), are missing from the FES.
For example, expenses on narcotics (under tobacco-related expenses) and even hospital services
(under health-related expenses) are unavailable in the expenditure data before 2001. I have not
used any supplemental data sources to account for these missing items.
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C.1. RESULTS
C.1.1. Gender-Bias in Anthropometric Measures
To investigate if there is any gender-bias in the anthropometric outcomes, I use the 3D estimator
within the OLS framework. As with the effect of the flood on breastfeeding, the 3D coefficients
show no significant effect. The sign on the 3D coefficient for weight-for-age z-score is negative,
indicating the negative relation for girls, but the magnitude is not discernible from zero.
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Table C.1.: Gender-Bias in Height and Weight
Height-for-Age
Z-score
Weight-for-Age
Z-score
(1) (2)
Cohort*Area –0.225 –0.091
(0.139) (0.127)
Cohort*Area*Female 0.335 –0.077
(0.227) (0.164)
Area*Female –0.461** 0.080
(0.178) (0.138)
Cohort*Female –0.349* 0.155
(0.211) (0.154)
Cohort –0.366** 0.447***
(0.155) (0.136)
Area 0.224** 0.112
(0.111) (0.110)
Female 0.306* –0.111
(0.167) (0.133)
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 5,258 5,258
R-squared 0.148 0.059
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Baseline controls
were applied.
C.1.2. Subjective Size at Birth
It is possible that the flood resulted in lower birth-weight children due to intrauterine malnutrition.
As a consequence, these children were breastfed more and scored lower in weight-for-height
z-scores. Unfortunately, there is no birth weight data on DHS Bangladesh. To overcome this
shortcoming, I use the available variable, a subjective measure of size at birth. Survey respondents
from DHS 2000 were asked if the size of their child at birth was ‘very small’, ‘small’, ‘average’,
‘large’ and ‘very large’. There is no standard definition for these sizes, instead the answer relies on
mother’s memory which may be biased by the current size of the child.
As I only have information from one wave of the DHS, I cannot use the same treatment and
control cohorts. Assuming 37 weeks gestation, children born between October 1998 and June
1999 should have been in utero during the flood. I consider these children as part of the treatment
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cohort. The unaffected (control) cohort comprises children born at any point in the three months
of the flood, July - September 1998. Together, this defines the new Cohort variable.
Table C.2 presents the results on the effect of the flood on two categories of birth size, Smaller
than Average (21 percent of sample) in column 1 and Larger than Average (15 percent of sample) in
columns 2. There is no effect of the flood on the perceived size at birth. The only indication of an
effect is on the negative sign associate with the coefficient of interest in column 1.
Table C.2.: Logistic Regression Estimates of the Effect of the
Flood on Subjective Size at Birth
Smaller than
Average
Larger than
Average
(1) (2)
Cohort*Area –0.174 0.228
(0.464) (0.489)
Area 0.290 –0.564
(0.407) (0.368)
Cohort 0.407 –0.617
(0.423) (0.446)
Observations 1,182 1,182
Mean 0.209 0.153
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Due to
the limited sample size, the controls are: linear birth order, a dummy
variable indicating if mother had no education, a dummy variable
indicating if father’s had no education, a dummy variable indicating if
father was involved in agriculture, mother’s height, a dummy for rural
residence, and a series of dummy variables for the seven divisions.
C.1.3. Terminated Pregnancies
As a further check into indications of positive selection, I analyse if there was any change in the
incidence of terminated pregnancies due to the flood. I construct as my treatment cohort all
pregnancy outcomes between July 1998 - June 1999, where an outcome is defined as giving
birth to a child alive, having still-birth, miscarriage or abortion. The control cohort includes all
pregnancy outcomes between July 2005 - June 2006. I use this time frame so that it includes all
pregnancies that could be affected by the flood, regardless of if it resulted in a birth. Area, High,
118
APPENDIX C. MANAGING EARLY-LIFE CLIMATE SHOCKS
andModerate are defined as before.
Next, I define a dummy variable, Terminate, that takes the value one if the pregnancy resulted
in still-birth, miscarriage or abortion, and zero otherwise. This is my dependent variable. My
control variables are: the pregnancy order (i.e. the number of pregnancies the mother has had prior
to this one), mother’s height, mother’s age, mother’s age at first birth, dummy variables indicating
if mother had no education, if father had no education, if father was involved in agriculture, and if
the house was located in a rural area, and finally, the full set of dummy variables for the division
(state) of residence.
Table C.3 presents the effect of the flood on terminated pregnancies. The unconditional mean
for terminated pregnancies was about 38.9 percent. Once again, there is no effect of the flood on
the pregnancy outcomes. If anything, the negative sign on the coefficients of interest indicate that
there might be some positive selection, but the magnitudes are not significantly different from
zero.
Table C.3.: Logistic Regression Estimates of the Effect of the
Flood on Terminated Pregnancies
(1) (2)
Cohort*Area –0.519
(0.394)
Cohort*High –0.402
(0.433)
Cohort*Moderate –0.553
(0.402)
High 0.769**
(0.377)
Moderate 0.735**
( 0.350)
Cohort 0.008 0.002
(0.379) (0.379)
Area 0.734**
(0.346)
Observations 4,135 4,135
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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